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INTRODUCTION
In 1977, a group of Nigerian constitution makers asked an astute
question. Following a gruesome civil war, Nigeria began the task of
crafting a federal constitutional democracy.1 Although the constitutional
delegates agreed on a decentralization of political power, they
nevertheless asked a separate question: should the Nigeria states be
permitted to adopt their own constitutions?2 The proceedings from the
1977 Constituent Assembly show that the delegates gave careful
consideration to that question as a distinct institutional choice.3 They
decided that although Nigeria was committed to a federal arrangement,
the states should not be permitted to adopt their own constitutions.4 State
constitutionalism, they concluded, had proven too “divisive”5 during
1. See generally DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 602-13
(1985) (recounting the history of Nigeria’s Two Republics between 1960 and 1983). The
1979 Nigerian Constitution was the result of a two-stage process that began with the
Constitutional Drafting Committee and ended with the document’s adoption by the
Constituent Assembly. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 176-77 (1987)
(explaining the Nigerian constitution-making process).
2. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, vol. 1, Nov. 16, 1977, at 78283. The constitutional delegates identified two justifications for retaining a federal
structure. First, federalism was a means of accommodating multiple ethnic groups within
the federation. See L. Adele Jinaduu, The Constitutional Situation of the Nigerian States,
12 PUBLIUS 155, 158-59 (1982). Second, decentralization of government agencies and
services was intended to facilitate public access to those goods. Id.
3. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, supra note 3, at 782-83
(“The third feature of the Draft Constitution is that we have no State Constitution[s]. . . .
If you look at the 1963 Constitution, you will find that each Region or each state has got
its own constitution, but that method has been abolished.”).
4. See REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTING COMMITTEE, vol 1, at iv (1977)
(“We have adopted the . . . method of having one instrument containing the constitution
of the Federation and for every state.”).
5. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, vol. 1, Nov. 16, 1977, at 782-83.
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Nigeria’s prior constitutional regime, and it “was inimical to the unity of
the country.”6
The Nigerian experience begs a deeper question that theorists have
largely neglected. Although scholars and constitution-makers have
developed various theories regarding the utilities of federalism,7 they
have not separately considered how subnational constitutions can
uniquely serve (or undermine) those same purposes. Nor have they
searched for any independent purposes that subnational constitutionalism
may serve. In short, theorists have largely failed to consider the
independent normative justifications for introducing subnational
constitutionalism into federal systems. As the Nigerian experience
illustrates, that theoretical question is not without serious practical
consequences.8
This Article takes up that important but neglected question. The
goal is to move towards a systematization and critical analysis of
possible justifications for introducing subnational constitutionalism into
federal systems. The Article first offers a description of subnational
constitutionalism that is derived from rational-choice theories of political
institutions and a survey of the world’s federal systems. 9 It concludes
that subnational constitutionalism is best described as a series of rules
(both formal and informal) that protect and define the authority of
subnational units within a federal system to exercise some degree of
independence in structuring and/or limiting the political power reserved
to them by the federation.10 Building upon that working description, the
Article argues that there are at least three coherent justifications for
subnational constitutionalism. First, it can deepen a federal system’s
6. Jinaduu, supra note 2, at 163-65 (discussing the committee’s deliberations and
conclusions regarding state constitutionalism); see ELAZAR, supra note 1, at 176 (“The
1979 federal constitution was designed to restore civilian rule to Nigeria.”).
7. See generally Donald L. Horowitz, The Many Uses of Federalism, 55 DRAKE L.
REV. 953 (2007). Federalism can, among other things, promote government efficiency,
accommodate group pluralism, and provide checks-and-balances that can protect against
tyranny. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
8. See Jinaduu, supra note 2, at 165 (analyzing whether the removal of subnational
constitutionalism from Nigeria’s federal structure actually served to unify the country or
whether unification may have been better served by allowing the Nigerian states “some
symbols of independence, such as separate constitutions of their own. . . .”). South
Africa presents another contemporary example where constitution makers separately
considered whether and how subnational constitutionalism should be incorporated into
the system’s federal structure. See Jonathan L. Marshfield, Authorizing Subnational
Constitutions in Transitional Federal States: South Africa, Democracy, and the
KwaZulu-Natal Constitution, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 585, 621-29 (2008) (discussing
South Africa’s constitutional deliberations regarding subnational constitutionalism and
the significance of subnational constitutionalism in the delicately negotiated transition
from apartheid to democracy).
9. See discussion infra Part I.
10. See discussion infra Part I.A.
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ability to accommodate multiple political communities within a single
constitutional regime.11
Second, it can uniquely contribute to
federalism’s liberty-protecting, check-and-balances function.12 Third,
the Article argues that scholars have largely overlooked the possibility
that subnational constitutionalism can improve the deliberative quality of
democracy within subnational units and the federal system as a whole.13
Modeling subnational constitutionalism in this way is valuable for
at least two reasons. First, it contributes to the study and practice of
institutional design.14 As Nigeria’s experience illustrates, contemporary
constitution makers are faced with myriad institutional choices that can
have important societal repercussions.
By modeling plausible
consequences associated with subnational constitutionalism, scholars can
help to inform those significant choices.15 Second, an institutional
perspective on subnational constitutionalism advances the study of
subnational constitutional theory. Subnational constitutions are too
frequently analyzed through the lens of generic constitutional theories
that assume single-constitution systems.16 In order to capitalize on the
great value of subnational constitutionalism, scholars must engage it as a
distinct institutional phenomenon that demands its own theoretical
inquiry.17 That inquiry should include the study of predictable

11. See discussion infra Part III.A.
12. See discussion infra Part III.B.
13. See discussion infra Part IV.
14. See Horowitz, supra note 7, at 953-55 (discussing in general terms the practice
and study of “constitutional design”). As used here, “institutional design” refers to the
purposeful and prospective task of designing political arrangements in view of their
expected consequences. Id. This task is frequently associated with rational-choice
theories of political institutions. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword:
Positive Political Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 462 (1992) (describing the
rational-choice based “positive political theory” approach to political institutions).
Noteworthy examples of legal scholarship in this field include DONALD L. HOROWITZ, A
DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA? CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY
(1991); Daniel J. Elazar, The Use of Federalism in the Reconstruction of the Ex-Soviet
Republics, in FEDERALISM AND THE WAY TO PEACE 73, 73 (1994); Daniel J. Elazar, Can
Federal Arrangements Serve the Cause of Middle East Peace?, in FEDERALISM AND THE
WAY TO PEACE 95, 95 (1994). Rational-choice theories of political institutions are
frequently traced to the theoretical work of economist Douglass C. North. See generally
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990).
15. See, e.g., HOROWITZ, supra note 14, at 124-231 (offering various institutional
design suggestions to deal with problems South Africa faced during its transition from
apartheid to democracy).
16. See JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 15-18 (2005)
(making this point vis-à-vis U.S. constitutional theory and state constitutional theory).
17. See generally Daniel J. Elazar, State Constitutional Design in the United States
and other Federal Systems, 12 PUBLIUS 1, 1-3 (1982) (suggesting some theoretical
questions unique to subnational constitutionalism).
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consequences associated with decentralizing responsibility for
structuring and limiting subnational power.
This Article has four parts. Part I presents and defends an
institutional description of subnational constitutionalism.
Part II
explores the implications of that definition for subnational constitutional
theory and federal theory. Part III discusses two commonly recognized
justifications for subnational constitutionalism. Part IV argues that one
overlooked justification for subnational constitutionalism is that it can
improve the deliberative quality of democracy within federal systems.
Because scholars have largely overlooked the deliberative capacities of
subnational constitutionalism, the Article devotes significant time to
developing and analyzing the potential for subnational constitutionalism
to contribute to the deliberative quality of federal constitutional
democracies. Part IV also includes a brief comment on the role of state
constitutions within the U.S. federal system.
I.

TOWARD AN INSTITUTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF SUBNATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM

What is subnational constitutionalism? This question has gone
almost unnoticed in the study of subnational constitutional law, but it is
the necessary starting point for any theoretical investigation regarding
the normative justifications for subnational constitutionalism.18 The goal
of this section is to accurately describe subnational constitutionalism
from both the theoretical standpoint of positive political theory and the
reality of the world’s federal systems.
A.

Institutions, Federalism, and Subnational Constitutionalism

Generally speaking, in the context of positive political theory,
political scientists use “institution” to refer to “the relatively durable
18. Research revealed only two instances where this question is directly addressed.
See G. Alan Tarr, Subnational Constitutional Space: An Agenda for Research (June
2007) (unpublished paper delivered at the World Congress of the International
Association of Constitutional Law, Athens, Greece, 2007, on file with the Rutgers Law
Journal)
available
at
http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/workshop11greece07/
workshop11/Tarr.pdf.; Cheryl Saunders, The Relationship Between National and
Subnational Constitutions, in SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE 11, 11
(Gretchen Carpenter ed., 1999). Tom Ginsburg and Eric A. Posner address a related
issue in their recent article, Subconstitutionalism, but their methodology is to identify a
series of conditions pursuant to which their agency model of “subconstitutionalism”
holds true. See Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1583, 1585 (2010) (“We use a simple theory that makes a single assumption that
distinguishes subconstitutions (that is, the constitutions of substates) from ordinary
constitutions: that the superior state in the two-tiered system reduces agency costs that
would otherwise exist in the subordinate state.”).
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structures and processes of political decisionmaking. . . . Institutions are
the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly
devised constraints that shape human interaction”19 In consequence they
structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or
economic.”20 Institutions can be formal, such as legal codes, or informal,
such as social customs, mores, and traditions.21
The crucial point is that institutions channel and structure human
behavior.22 This can happen in a variety of ways. Institutions can create
negative incentives for particular actions by issuing prohibitions backed
by appreciable consequences.23 Conversely, they can create affirmative
incentives for desirable behaviors.24 Institutions can also affect decisions
by issuing rules that adjust costs relevant to decision making.25
This approach to societal outcomes is useful for the study of legal
arrangements because it provides a tool for forecasting likely social
consequences associated with specific constitutional arrangements.26 By
identifying and analyzing the behavioral incentives and the menu of
choices that constitutional rules will produce, it is possible to construct
coherent models of institutional design.27 That is, we can theorize
regarding whether particular constitutional rules will likely produce
specified normatively desirable outcomes.28
19. Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 681 (2011) (citations omitted); see generally
Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutionalism and the Domain of Normative Theory, 37
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 523, 537-38 (2000) (describing positive political theory and rationalchoice theories of institutional politics); Farber & Frickey, supra note 14, at 462 (same).
20. NORTH, supra note 14, at 3-4; see also Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional
Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts,
Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1176 (2003) (applying institutional
analysis).
21. NORTH, supra note 14, at 3-4.
22. This does not mean that institutions are static and fixed. In reality, political
institutions are “fluid and constructed.” Rodriguez, supra note 19, at 537-38. They
nevertheless provide form to and create incentives that channel human decision making.
PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 2-4
(2004) (exploring the significance of the “temporal dimensions of social life for our
understanding of important political outcomes”).
23. See generally NORTH, supra note 14, at 3-69 (discussing the ways in which
institutions can affect behavior).
24. Id.
25. See Rodriguez, supra note 19, at 537-38.
26. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 14, 463-71 (discussing application of positive
political theory models to legal issues).
27. The well-documented criticism of this approach is that it makes various
assumptions regarding human nature and choice. See Herbert Simon, Rationality in
Psychology and Economics, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS
AND PSYCHOLOGY 25, 25-40 (Hogarth & Reder eds., 1986).
28. See e.g., Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court’s
“Unsteady Path”: A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1447, 1448 (1995) (constructing “a rational actor model along the lines developed by
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Within this paradigm, federalism can accurately be described as a
set of rules (both formal and informal) that maintain a political system
that divides power between various levels of government.29 This
theoretical paradigm also suggests a coherent description of subnational
constitutionalism. It is best described as a set of rules (both formal and
informal) that protect and define the authority of subnational units within
a federal system to exercise some degree of independence in structuring
and/or limiting the political power reserved to them by the federation.30
As a political institution, federalism concerns the rules that divide
power between levels of government. Subnational constitutionalism, on
the other hand, concerns those particular rules that relate to the
subnational units’ ability to structure and limit their own power.31
Subnational constitutionalism is therefore derivative of federalism
because it cannot exist without a federal division of political power. It is
nevertheless institutionally distinct from federalism because it concerns a
separate set of rules directed to a different set of political choices.
Thus, from the standpoint of institutional design, the architecture of
a federal system involves at least three analytically distinct institutional
choices. First, constitution makers must determine whether it is
appropriate or desirable to divide power between levels of government;
i.e., whether to adopt a federal rather than a unitary structure. Second,
they must determine which government competencies should be assigned
to each level of government. Third, they must determine what degree of
independence (if any) subnational units should have in structuring and
positive political theory” that “exploits the . . . assumption that institutional design and
structure have profound effects on the way purposive, self-interested government
institutions interact.”).
29. See ELAZAR, supra note 1, at 33-38 (describing federalism as a system of rules
that retains a decentralized and diffuse organization of political power); Horowitz, supra
note 7, at 958 (describing federalism as “the existence of substate territorial units holding
some governmental power that the central government does not hold”).
30. In a sense, all federal systems contain subnational constitutions because
subnational power must be organized (or “constituted”) in some way. Saunders, supra
note 18, at 26; Ronald L. Watts, States, Provinces, Länder, and Cantons: International
Variety Among Subnational Constitutions, 31 RUTGERS L. J. 941, 951-52 (2000).
However, as explained below, subnational constitutionalism as a distinct institutional
phenomenon occurring within the world’s federal systems is narrower. See discussion
infra Part I.B (discussing legal characteristics of subnational constitutionalism). It
concerns the authority of subnational units to structure and limit their own power.
31. Although subnational constitutionalism is not usually articulated in this way, the
Argentinean Constitution contains a particularly astute description. It declares that the
provinces shall adopt constitutions that “determine their own local institutions and are
governed by them” and provide for the election of “their governors, legislators, and other
provincial officers, without intervention of the federal government.” Art. 122,
CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL (Arg.); see generally Watts, supra note 30, at 951-52
(cataloging the various sources of authority within federal regimes for subnational units
to adopt their own constitutions).
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limiting their assigned powers; i.e., whether to incorporate subnational
constitutionalism.32
Conceptualizing the relationship between
subnational constitutionalism and federalism in this way is a first step
towards a coherent analysis of the independent normative justifications
for introducing subnational constitutionalism into federal systems.
B.

Legal Characteristics of Subnational Constitutionalism

The above theoretical description finds support in the reality of the
world’s federal systems. A survey of those systems reveals more
concrete legal parameters that circumscribe subnational constitutionalism
as a distinct institutional phenomenon: (1) subnational units must have
independence regarding some fundamental content such as government
structure and individual rights; (2) subnational constitutions must be
entrenchable and supreme relative to other forms of subnational law; and
(3) subnational constitutions must be endorsed by their respective
subnational communities.33
1.

Contingent Fundamental Content

A federal system allows for subnational constitutionalism only if it
permits subnational units some discretion in framing and/or limiting
subnational government. That is, the rules of the federal regime must

32. These three steps can be further divided into additional institutional choices that
may give rise to a variety of creative institutional arrangements. The point here is not to
provide a comprehensive algorithm for federal design, but to clearly disentangle the
decision to adopt federalism from the decision to adopt subnational constitutionalism.
33. The methodology here is primarily descriptive. There are approximately twenty
formally federal systems in the world. See ELAZAR, supra note 1, at 177-78 (listing
federal countries as of 1987; updated to include Iraq and South Africa); see John Dinan,
Patterns of Subnational Constitutionalism in Federal Countries, 39 RUTGERS L. J. 837,
839 (2008) (updating Elazar’s 1987 list). Of these twenty systems, fourteen permit
subnational units to adopt constitutions. See ELAZAR, supra note 1, at 177-78; see also
Dinan, supra, at 839. Those fourteen systems are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil,
Ethiopia, Germany, Iraq, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, the
United States, and Venezuela. Dinan, supra, at 839-40; see also John Dinan, Patterns
and Developments in Subnational Constitutional Amendment Processes (May 15, 2009)
(unpublished paper presented at Symposium: Redefining the Political Order: New
Processes
for
Constitution-Making,
Universite
Naval)
available
at
http://www.democratie. chaire.ulaval.ca/Upload/article_dinan._27082009_160838.pdf)
[hereinafter Patterns and Developments].
The description of subnational
constitutionalism offered here accurately reflects subnational constitutionalism as it exists
in those systems. The Article does not make a normative claim that all of the
characteristics describe here are necessary conditions of subnational constitutionalism.
Rather, the claim is that within the world’s federal systems there is an identifiable
institutional phenomenon that can appropriately be called subnational constitutionalism.
This institutional phenomenon is characterized by the features described here.
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permit subnational units to address fundamental issues such as
government structure and/or individual rights.
However, subnational constitutions are by definition substantively
contingent. All federal constitutional democracies have an overarching
constitutional structure that captures the people’s choices regarding the
appropriate allocation of powers between the various levels of
government.34 Subnational constitutions operate within this legally
defined “space,” which is circumscribed by the national constitution.35
The national constitution determines exactly what “range of
discretion . . . is available to the component units in a federal system in
designing their constitutional arrangements. . . .”36
Subnational
constitutions are therefore second-order institutions in that their scope of
substantive content and the realm of permissible constitutional choices
available to subnational communities are legally constrained by the
national constitution.37 In this sense, the content of subnational

34. See Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38
AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 205 (1990) (“As a system of divided powers, federalism proceeds
from the very essence of constitutionalism, which is limited government operating under
the rule of law.”). Koen Lenaerts has identified two kinds of federal systems: integrative
federalism and devolutionary federalism. He distinguishes the two models as follows:
Integrative federalism refers to a constitutional order that strives at unity in
diversity among previously independent or confederally related component
entities. The goal of establishing an effective central government with direct
operation on the people inside its sphere of powers is pursued under respect of
the powers of the component entities, at least to the extent that the use by the
latter of these powers does not revert into divisiveness.
...
Devolutionary federalism, on the contrary, refers to a constitutional order that
redistributes the powers of a previously unitary State among its component
entities; these entities obtain an autonomous status within their fields of
responsibility. The principal concern is to organize diversity in unity.
Id. at 206. The description here does not exclude either of these two models. Although
those models develop differently, they both ultimately result in an overarching national
constitution that defines the scope of “constitutional space” afforded to subnational units.
Nor does the description require that the overarching constitutional arrangement be
contained in a single constitutional text. Federations such as Austria maintain
subnational constitutionalism based on a federal constitution that is comprised of various
constitutional acts. See Anna Gamper, Austrian Federalism and the Protection of
Minorities, in FEDERALISM, SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, AND MINORITY RIGHTS 55, 55
(G. Alan Tarr et al., eds. 2004) (describing Austria’s federal arrangement).
35. Robert F. Williams & G. Alan Tarr, Subnational Constitutional Space: A View
From the States, Provinces, Regions, Länder and Cantons, in FEDERALISM, SUBNATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS, AND MINORITY RIGHTS 3, 3-25 (G. Alan Tarr et al. eds., 2004)
(describing the substantive legal “space” afforded subnational constitutions in different
federal systems).
36. Id. at 5.
37. See Watts, supra note 30, at 954 (“[I]ssues of the scope of jurisdiction of
subnational governments and their interrelationship with the national or federal
government have always been defined in the national or federal constitution. . . .”).
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constitutions is contingent on the rules of the particular federal regime
within which they reside.
Thus, the “constitutional space” allotted to subnational units
regarding fundamental content takes various forms. Some federal
regimes, for example, allow subnational units to establish legislative and
executive branches, but prohibit subnational units from creating their
own judiciary.38 Many federal regimes impose specific structural and
procedural parameters within which subnational units must operate when
designing their institutions.39 Federal regimes may also establish default
structural provisions for all subnational governments, but allow
subnational units to adopt their own constitutions that deviate from those
default provisions if they choose.40 It is also common for federal regimes
to establish certain national minimum standards regarding individual
rights, but permit subnational units to provide greater protection above
this minimum standard.41 Furthermore, the rules regarding subnational
constitutional space need not be the same for all subnational units.

38. Id.
39. Brazil is a good example of this. Its national constitution provides many
particulars regarding legislative and executive structure and procedure. See, e.g.,
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 27 (Braz.) (“The term of the State Representatives is
four years, and they are subject to the provisions of this Constitution regarding the
electoral system, inviolability, immunities, compensation, loss of office, leave of absence,
impairments, and enlisting into the Armed Forces.”); C.F. art. 28 (“The election of the
State Governor and Vice Governor, for a term of office of four years, is held ninety days
before the end of their predecessors’ term of office, and they take office on January 1st of
the subsequent year, observing, otherwise, the provisions of Article 77.”).
40. South Africa presents the only active example of this arrangement. South
Africa’s national constitution provides “full particulars” regarding all necessary
provincial government institutions.
I.M. RATENBACH & E.F.J. MALHERBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 244 n. 22 (4th ed. 2004); see In re Certification of the Constitution
of the Western Cape 1997 (9) BCLR 1167 (CC) at para. 15 (S. Afr.) (“[The national
constitution] provides a complete blueprint for the regulation of government within
provinces which provides adequately for the establishment and functioning of provincial
legislatures and executives.”). The provinces may nevertheless adopt their own
constitutions that deviate, to a very limited degree, from the national constitution’s
default design. See Marshfield, supra note 8, at 591-95 (describing the provinces’ limited
constitutional space). The South African Constitutional Court has held that provincial
constitutions may alter provincial institutions and may, in principle, contain a bill of
rights. See Robert F. Williams, Comparative Subnational Constitutional Law: South
Africa’s Provincial Constitutional Experiments, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 625, 638-40 (1999)
(describing Constitutional Court’s rulings).
41. The Austrian Constitution, for example, expressly provides that states may “not
impose more stringent conditions for suffrage and electoral eligibility than the electoral
regulations for the House of Representatives.” BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG]
[Constitution] Art. 95; see Robert F. Williams, Comparative State Constitutional Law: A
Research Agenda on Subnational Constitutions in Federal Systems, in LAW IN MOTION
339 (Roger Blanpain, ed. 1996) (discussing this phenomenon generally).
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Asymmetrical federal arrangements can tailor subnational constitutional
space to particular subnational units.42
The purpose here is not to catalogue those variations but simply to
note that subnational constitutional space must permit subnational units
some discretion regarding fundamental content.43 A federal system that
establishes subnational government institutions and does not permit
subnational units to alter or limit those institutions in any way does not
provide for subnational constitutionalism. Of the fourteen federal
systems that currently permit subnational units to adopt constitutions,44
all of those systems give some degree of discretion to their subnational
units regarding fundamental content.45
2.

Entrenchment and Supremacy

Some form of entrenchment is necessary to distinguish subnational
constitutions from legislation. This is implicit in the use of a written
instrument to structure and limit government authority. 46 A definitional
component of constitutionalism is that sovereignty resides with the
42. See generally Horowitz, supra note 7, at 959 (discussing asymmetrical
federalism). India provides a classic example of an asymmetrical subnational
constitutional federal system because it permits only one state, Kashmir, to adopt a
written constitution. See INDIA CONST. arts. 168-212 (describing the competencies of
India’s states); see also Elazar, supra note 17, at 9 (describing India’s structural
arrangement). Malaysia and South Africa provide additional examples. Malaysia’s
national constitution provides, among other asymmetrical allowances, that two states
(Sabah and Sarawak), may make law regarding substantive areas prohibited to other
states. See MALAYSIA CONST. Art. 95B. South Africa’s 1993 Interim National
Constitution provided that all provinces could “provide for the institution, role, authority
and status of a traditional monarch,” but required that the province of KwaZulu-Natal
specifically adopt a constitution that provided for the recognition of the “Zulu Monarch.”
S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993 § 160(3)(b).
43. See generally THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION 91-96 (8th ed. 1927) (listing the essential content of a state constitution
within the U.S. federal system); Frank P. Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and
Form for Our Time, 54 VA. L. REV. 928 (1968) (same).
44. Those fourteen systems are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Ethiopia,
Germany, Iraq, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, the United States,
and Venezuela. Dinan, supra note 33, at 839-40.
45. Some systems, such as South Africa, permit subnational units only minimal
“space” regarding subnational constitutions. See infra notes 63-72 and accompanying
text. Other systems, such as the United States and Germany, provide subnational units
with a great degree of discretion regarding constitutional issues. See infra notes 110-18
and accompanying text. In any event, all fourteen systems provide some degree of
discretion regarding their subnational units’ ability to organize and/or limit their
subnational power.
46. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY 97-105 (2001) (discussing
entrenchment’s role vis-à-vis constitutionalism); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes
to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separation of Powers, and the Rules of
Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 375-76 (2003) (same).
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people and that government representatives are agents subject to the trust
agreement created by the people.47 The consequence of this is that the
trust agreement must be entrenched beyond the ordinary authority of
government officials. In order to constrain the regular activities of
government officials, the trust agreement must be changeable only by
special and more arduous procedures.48 A corollary of this is that
constitutional law must be supreme.49 Ordinary legislation or any other
form of law that contradicts the constitution must be invalid.
Although subnational power is always contingent upon the
overarching national constitution, the decision to allow subnational units
some discretion in structuring and limiting that power implies that a
suitable instrument is available for the task. To the degree that federal
regimes allow subnational units to structure their delegated power by use
of a subnational constitution, the constitution must be entrenchable and
supreme. Subnational constitutions must be entrenched beyond the
ordinary authority of the government officials and institutions that they
constitute. If subnational constitutions are not entrenchable and
supreme, they cease to be effective restraints on subnational authority,
and, consequently, cease to be constitutions.
Again, mechanisms for entrenchment may vary. Some federal
regimes impose universal top-down entrenchment standards.50 Other
regimes may simply protect the subnational units’ rights to develop their
own entrenchment mechanisms.51 Whatever the rules, the point is that
47. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 3-5 (1991) (“a written
constitution is like a trust agreement. It specifies what powers the trustees are to have
and it endows these agents with certain authority delegated by the settler who created the
trust.”).
48. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A
Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385, 418-29 (2003) (discussing
purposes of entrenchment).
49. Constitutionalism is necessarily connected with the rule of law, which requires
that government itself be subject to law. The supremacy of constitutional law is designed
to realize this ideal. See Harvey Wheeler, The Foundations of Constitutionalism, 8 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 507, 508 (1975).
50. Austria’s arrangement is an example. See BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [BVG] [Constitution] Art. 99(2) (“A State constitutional law can be passed only in the
presence of half the members of the State Parliament and with a two thirds majority of
the votes cast”). South Africa’s national constitution also provides a universal
entrenchment standard. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 142. (provincial constitutions can only
be amended by a two-thirds majority of the provincial legislature). See generally Dinan,
supra note 33, at 846 (discussing amendment procedures of subnational constitutions in
world’s federal systems).
51. The U.S. is a good example of this. The U.S. Supreme Court has traditionally
defended the authority of the states to determine their own institutional arrangements.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 256 (1957) (“It would make the deepest inroads
upon our federal system for this Court now to hold that it can determine the appropriate
distribution of powers and their delegation within the forty-eight States”). Federal courts
have refused to subject state constitutional amendment rules and procedures to searching
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subnational constitutions must be insulated from the ordinary political
process, so that the organs of government they establish are not entitled
to change their own powers in the ordinary course of their official duties.
3.

Community Endorsement

Subnational constitutions are derivative of both internal and external
political communities. This is true regarding the content of subnational
constitutions as well as their democratic legitimacy. As an external
presence, the national political community defines the substantive space
within which a subnational community can move when constituting
itself. It determines, for example, what individual rights a subnational
community can constitutionalize, and may impose some limitations on
how subnational units design government institutions. Thus, subnational
constitutions derive in part from the authority and preferences of the
national community and in part from the authority and preferences of
their corresponding subnational communities.52
By granting subnational communities some discretion regarding
how subnational power will be organized and limited, a federal regime
inevitably vests subnational communities with a degree of selfgovernance.53 Subnational constitutions are, by definition, intended to
reflect some degree of local input regarding the structure of subnational
authority. A federal regime that does not allow for subnational input
regarding the structuring of subnational authority, does not allow for
genuine subnational constitutionalism.
One can imagine, for example, a national authority that crafts
particularized constitutions for subnational units without any direct input
from the subnational community. Under the description of subnational
constitutionalism proposed here, those documents would not qualify as
review. See, e.g., Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271 (1st Cir. 2005). As a result, the
states have developed a variety of different mechanisms and procedures for constitutional
change. See THE BOOK OF THE STATES 14-19 (listing all amendment procedures for all
states). But see Erwin Chemerisnky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should be
Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849, 880 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court should
review certain state law-making procedures under the Federal Constitution).
52. See Saunders, supra note 18, at 26 (“No subnational constitution is completely
uncontrolled. . . . [S]ubnational constitutions therefore draw on the authority of the
people organized nationally, as well as the authority of the people of the subnational
community.”). This duality is inherent in the nature of federal arrangements. See
ELAZAR, supra note 1, at 12 (defining federalism as a system of “self-rule plus shared
rule”).
53. See ELAZAR, supra note 1, at 107-09 (explaining that decentralization of any
substantive powers invariably implicates self-governance of subnational units); see
generally VINCENT OSTROM, THE MEANING OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM: CONSTITUTING A
SELF-GOVERNING SOCIETY (1991) (exploring role of state authority in achieving selfgovernance for U.S. as whole).
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subnational constitutions because they are entirely derivative of the
national community. Although they are “constitutional” in the sense that
they structure subnational authority, they are not “subnational” because
they do not derive any content or portion of their legitimacy from the
input or endorsement of their respective subnational communities.
Community endorsement may or may not involve direct popular
input from subnational communities. Representative input may suffice
so long as the relevant officials represent the particular interests of the
subnational community. However, line-drawing is especially hard in this
regard. Some federal regimes organize subnational governments by
enacting “regional autonomy statutes” for subnational units.54 These
statutes are ultimately approved by national institutions, which may
include representatives from the affected subnational unit.55 Unless
those representatives are given exceptional authority regarding those
statutes—by means of some sort of region-based veto for example—it
would seem that simply casting a vote in the national body does not
amount to a satisfactory level of local input, and these statutes would not
qualify as genuine—or at least pure—subnational constitutions.56
II.

SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

Before exploring possible justification for introducing subnational
constitutionalism into federal systems, it is necessary to disentangle
subnational constitutionalism (as described above) from two related but
distinct concepts: constitutionalism and federalism. The goal of this
section is to demonstrate that the justifications for constitutionalism and
federalism do not necessarily provide coherent explanations for why
federal systems would choose to also incorporate subnational
constitutionalism. In other words, current theories of constitutionalism
and federalism provide incomplete justifications for subnational
constitutionalism. It is important, therefore, that theorists engage
subnational constitutionalism as a distinct institution that requires its own
theoretical justifications.

54. See Tarr, supra note 18, at 5 (discussing Spain’s “autonomy statutes” and Italy’s
Statuti); see also ANDY SMITH & PAUL HEYWOOD, REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE
AND SPAIN 22-30 (2000) (discussing complexities of Spain’s autonomy statutes and
suggesting that local input plays a large role in their content). Canada has a similar
system for organizing provincial authority. See G. Alan Tarr, Subnational Constitutions
and Minority Rights: A Perspective on Canadian Provincial Constitutionalism, 40
RUTGERS L. J. 767, 771-73 (2009).
55. SMITH & HEYWOOD, supra note 54, at 22-30.
56. See Saunders, supra note 18, at 27 (discussing the implications of nominal
subnational input for genuine subnational constitutionalism).
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Constitutional Theory and Subnational Constitutionalism

In one sense, subnational constitutions serve the same purpose as
any constitution: they are a legal instrument useful for limiting and
structuring government power.57 However, within federal constitutional
democracies, the choice regarding whether and how to incorporate
subnational constitutionalism is not a choice between constitutional
governance and some other political regime. Even those federal systems
that reject subnational constitutionalism use their national constitution to
limit and structure subnational power.58 Subnational constitutionalism
therefore needs to be justified by reasons independent of the general
justifications for constitutionalism.
It demands an independent
theoretical inquiry that seeks to answer the question: what are the
normative justifications for decentralizing responsibility for structuring
and limiting subnational power?
It is important not to oversimplify that question. The great variety
of arrangements (and possibilities) regarding the scope and structure of
subnational
constitutional
space
suggests
that
subnational
constitutionalism can be channeled toward dramatically different roles
from regime to regime.59 Indeed, some regimes may provide subnational
units with very limited constitutional space, allowing those units
discretion in only a handful of carefully selected constitutional issues.60
Other regimes may allow subnational units significant discretion
regarding a wide range of constitutional issues constrained only by a
handful of carefully crafted limits.61 Thus, although socio-political
conditions will certainly affect the role that subnational constitutionalism
assumes, the top-down task of crafting subnational constitutional space
determines what sort of political choices are available to subnational
units in the first instance, and, consequently, the roles that subnational

57. See BOBBITT, supra note 47, at 3-5.
58. These five systems are India, Pakistan, Nigeria, the United Arab Emirates, and
the Comoro Islands. See ELAZAR, supra note 1, at 178.
59. See Elazar, supra note 17, at 2 (noting that an important question in the study of
subnational constitutional law is: “What is the contemporary and future significance of
constitute state constitutions and constitution making, given the present and likely future
condition of the federal systems in which they function?”).
60. Malaysia, Brazil, and South Africa provide good examples of federal regimes
that provide very narrowly tailored constitutional space to their constituent units. See G.
Alan Tarr, Explaining Sub-national Constitutional Space, 115 Penn St. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2011) (discussing limited subnational constitutional space in Malaysia and
Brazil); Marshfield, supra note 8, at 591-95 (discussing the limited subnational
constitutional space in South Africa).
61. The United States provides an obvious example. Germany and Austria provide
other examples of federal systems where subnational units have significant constitutional
space. See Tarr, supra note 60, at 3-4.
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constitutionalism can assume within a particular federal regime.62 Or, in
the terms of positive political theory, subnational constitutionalism can
facilitate dramatically different social outcomes from regime to regime
because the malleability of subnational constitutional space can create
very different incentive structures from regime to regime.
Consider the differences between state constitutions in the U.S.
federal system and provincial constitutions in South Africa. Within the
U.S., state constitutions are necessary because although the federal
constitution presumes the existence of state government, it makes no
provision for its establishment.63 Additionally, because the 10th
Amendment reserves all residual authority to the states, state law
represents a significant and necessary corpus of law within the U.S.64
State constitutions are therefore needed to set up the institutions
necessary for, among other things, the creation, interpretation, and
enforcement of state law.65 As a result, state constitutions are an
undeniably important source of positive law within the checks-andbalance scheme of American federalism because the federal constitution
does not provide comprehensive limits on state authority.66
In contrast, provincial constitutions are not necessary in South
Africa because the national constitution establishes and comprehensively
limits provincial government institutions.67 Provinces may choose to
adopt constitutions that provide for the status of traditional leadership
and deviate from the national constitution’s default structural provisions
in insignificant ways.68 Because of this very limited constitutional space,
provincial constitutions are not a meaningful source of independently
enforceable constitutional rights.69 Yet, two provinces chose to adopt
62. See id. at 4-5 (noting that “law defines the formal constrains on sub-national
constitutional space” and “political factors . . . ultimately determine the use of
subnational constitutional space.”).
63. See generally Donald S. Lutz, The United States Constitution as an Incomplete
Text, 496 ANNALS 23 (1982) (explaining how the U.S. Constitution is “incomplete”).
64. Id.
65. See Grad, supra note 43, at 928-29 (explaining necessary content of state
constitutions in light of U.S. Constitution’s incompleteness).
66. State constitutions are necessary to provide specific constraints on state
government action, and they have also developed into a meaningful source of individual
rights. See Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow: Legitimacy of State
Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353 (1984)
(discussing state constitutionalism in the U.S.).
67. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 142. The South African Constitution establishes
provincial executives and legislatures, but permits the provinces to adopt their own
constitutions that diverge from the national constitution’s default institutional provisions.
See DIRK BRAND & RASSIE MALHERBE, South Africa: Sub-national Constitutional Law, in
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS 1, 13-27, 75-115 (A. Alen et al. eds., 2001).
68. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 143.
69. See generally Stuart Woolman, Provincial Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 21-i, 21-1 to -20 (Michael Bishop et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005)
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constitutions.70 In 1996, KwaZulu-Natal adopted a constitution primarily
for the purpose of recognizing the Zulu monarch.71 In 1998, the Western
Cape, the only other province with significant opposition support,
adopted a constitution, as a means of demonstrating a degree of
independence from the majority party.72 Thus, provincial constitutions
have proven valuable as a means of allowing subnational communities to
formalize their unique political identities.
In short, subnational constitutionalism cannot be justified by
reference to the general justifications for constitutional governance, nor
does it serve an archetypal function across all federal systems. Rather, it
demands an independent theoretical inquiry that explores the various
normative goals that it may serve across federal systems and accounts for
the different purposes that subnational constitutionalism can serve
depending on the rules of the federal regime within which it exists.
B.

Federal Theory and Subnational Constitutionalism

Legal scholars, political scientists, and economists have articulated
various justifications for federalism. It may, for example, promote
efficient provision of government services,73 protect group pluralism,74
promote democratic participation,75 or protect against government
(discussing the legal status of provincial constitutions within South Africa’s structural
framework and concluding that provincial constitutions “will never amount to more than
window dressing”). This does not mean that they are not meaningful political institutions
within South Africa’s federal system. See George E. Devenish, The Making and
Significance of the Draft Kwazulu-Natal Constitution, 1999 Y.B. AFRICAN LAW 47, 50506 (discussing the immense political significance of provincial constitutions); Marshfield,
supra note 8, at 621-38 (discussing the institutional significance of provincial
constitutionalism during the negotiated transition to democracy). It simply means that
their function is other than operating as a meaningful source of positive law that
contributes to federalism’s checks-and-balances function.
70. See Brand & Malherbe, supra note 67, at 86-115 (discussing KwaZulu-Natal and
Western Cape Constitutions).
71. See Devenish, supra note 69, at 505-06. The KwaZulu-Natal constitution was
eventually invalidated by the Constitutional Court because various provisions not related
to the Zulu Monarch were ultra vires. See In re Certification of the Constitution of the
Province of KwaZulu-Natal 1996 (11) BCLR 1419 (CC) para. 2 (S. Afr.).
72. Dirk Brand, The Western Cape Constitution, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 961, 961, 966
(2000); see also Jonathan L. Marshfield, Federalism and Political Competition in
Emerging Democracies, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011)
(discussing role of Western Cape constitution as a means of fostering political
competition in a one-party dominated political arena).
73. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
416-24 (1956); see Jinaduu, supra note 2, at 159 (discussing this as a justification for the
1979 Nigerian Constitution).
74. See Horowitz, surpa note 7, at 953; Jinaduu, supra note 2, at 159 (discussing this
as a justification for the 1979 Nigerian Constitution).
75. See ELAZAR, supra note 1, at 84 (“federalism in its broadest sense is presented as
a form of justice—emphasizing liberty and citizen participation in governance”).
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tyranny.76 Each of those theories offers an account of how assigning
certain political competencies to different levels of government can aid a
society in achieving a specified normatively desirable outcome. Those
theories do not, however, necessarily explain why a regime may choose
to allow subnational units some discretion in how those powers will be
organized and further limited. The justifications for delegating power to
subnational units (the justifications for federalism) are not necessarily the
same as the justifications for allowing subnational units discretion
concerning the organization and limits of that power (the justifications
for subnational constitutionalism).77
For example, if a federal system operates principally to promote
government efficiency,78 it may be inefficient to allow each subnational
unit significant discretion in determining how to organize subnational
power. A lack of institutional uniformity may increase costs and further
complicate governmental structure; thus reducing efficiency.79 A
different federal system may be designed to accommodate cultural or
ethnic pluralism.80 In that case, allowing subnational units to structure
their own institutions may be an important means of accommodating
group pluralism by promoting self-determination.81 A third hypothetical
system may value efficiency and group pluralism. In an attempt to
preserve efficiency, such a regime may provide subnational units with
very little discretion regarding the structure of subnational government,
but, in an effort to accommodate group pluralism, it may grant
subnational units significant discretion regarding morally laden issues
such as individual rights.
The point is simply that it is not sound reasoning to equate the
justifications for federalism with the justifications for subnational
constitutionalism. In trying to understand the complexities of federal
systems, it is important that we evaluate the justifications for devolving
political power to subnational units as well as any independent or cross76. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 5, at 318 (James Madison).
77. In a recent paper, Professor Tarr notes that the “purposes underlying” the
creation of a federation are not accurate indicators of how federal systems craft their
subnational constitutional space. See Tarr, supra note 60, at 3-4. This is further evidence
of the fact that subnational constitutionalism is a distinct institutional phenomenon that
requires its own justifications.
78. Germany and Austria are good examples of this.
See BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [Constitution] Art. 102(1) & 103(1); Tarr, supra note 60, at
3-4 (noting that Germany and Austria are structured this way).
79. See Tarr, supra note 60, at 4 (concluding that because federalism in Germany
and Austria is designed to promote administrative efficiency, “one would expect that
such federations would emphasize concurrent rather than exclusive powers and accord
their constituent units very limited constitutional space.”).
80. Nigeria, Iraq, and South Africa provide examples of this sort.
81. See Tarr, supra note 60, at 3.

2011]

MODELS OF SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM

1169

cutting justifications for allowing subnational units to organize and limit
that power. A theory of federalism that ignores the independent role that
subnational constitutions can play is analytically incomplete.
Subnational constitutionalism warrants its own theoretical inquiry.
III. TWO PREVAILING CONCEPTIONS OF SUBNATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Theorists have yet to directly engage subnational constitutional
theory as described above. Nevertheless, the literature discussing the
role of state constitutions within the U.S. federal system as well as the
growing body of literature discussing comparative subnational
constitutional law hint at two normative justifications for subnational
constitutionalism.82
A.

The Demos Model of Subnational Constitutionalism

Perhaps the most intuitive justification for subnational
constitutionalism is that it can allow for consolidated subnational
communities to achieve a degree of political self-determination.83 This
model is most applicable to federal systems that are made up of
geographically clustered subnational political communities, each of
which is characterized by a tractable political demos. Subnational
constitutions ensure that although these diverse federal communities are
united under one national constitution, they are still able to exercise “the
most basic political right . . . the right to self-determination.”84 The right
to self-determination includes “the power to determine the fundamental
character, membership, and future course of [the community’s] political
society.”85 Subnational constitutionalism ensures that although the right
82. These models are not intended to be mutually exclusive. That is, each federal
system does not fall exclusively into one model. Different federal systems may bear
characteristics of several different models all at once or during different periods in time.
The models are presented separately for theoretical purposes only.
83. Professor Tarr provides a very clear statement of this position. See Tarr, supra
note 54, at 783 (“Perhaps the basic political right, particularly for internal nations within
multi-national countries, is the right of self-determination—the power to determine the
fundamental character, membership, and future course of their political society.”).
84. Id. According to Professor Tarr, the right to group “self-determination” is “the
fundamental purpose of subnational constitution-making.”
Id.
Professor Tarr
characterizes other purposes for subnational constitutionalism as “instrumental.” He
concludes that “these instrumental purposes pale in comparison with the fundamental
purpose of constitution-making.”
Id.
This characterization of subnational
constitutionalism is at odds with the view presented here, which is thoroughly
instrumentalist.
This Article takes the position that the use of subnational
constitutionalism to promote group self-determination is simply one of many
instrumental functions that subnational constitutionalism can perform.
85. Id.
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to self-determination is “inevitably limited when nations are constituent
members of a larger political entity, . . . it is not effaced.”86
Under this model, the institutional function of subnational
constitutions within the federal system is to express and preserve the
identity of consolidated subnational polities.87 It is important to
recognize that this model is grounded in more than thin principles of selfgovernance, which can be achieved by simply decentralizing policymaking and administrative power to local government. This model is
concerned not only with the ability of subnational polities to govern
themselves, but with their ability to determine how they will govern
themselves; to determine, to a degree, how they will be constituted as
political communities.
The effectiveness of using subnational constitutionalism to achieve
political self-determination would seem to be directly proportional to the
degree of relevant independence each subnational community has in
customizing its government structure.88 That is, the model is most
effective when: (1) the federal system is characterized by highly salient
subnational political communities that track the territorial boundaries
demarcating subnational units; and (2) the federal system affords
subnational units independence regarding substantive issues relevant to
the political identity of subnational political communities.89 Thus, this
86. Id.
87. The normative assumption in this model is that group self-determination is a
good in itself. That norm appears to be grounded in a Lockean conception of state
legitimacy. See GARDNER, supra note 16, at 59-61 (discussing the connection between
this model and Lockean political theory). Ethiopia’s federal system illustrates this
superbly. The federal constitution includes the right of consolidated political groups
within existing subnational units to apply for statehood. ETHIOPIAN CONST. art. 47(3)
(1994). The Constitution recognizes “[t]he right of any Nation, Nationality or People to
form its own state” pursuant to certain procedural requirements. Id.
88. There are obvious limitations to this model. See Tarr, supra note 54, at 783-84
(discussing limitations on right to self-determination inherent in federal system). First,
within any federal system, self-determination is a matter of degree because subnational
units do not have complete autonomy. See Saunders, supra note 18, at 26 (“No
subnational constitution is completely uncontrolled.”). Nevertheless, subnational
constitutionalism makes some degree of self-determination possible within a unified
federal system. Second, political identity is a blurry concept. People may view
themselves vis-à-vis a multiplicity of politically relevant relationships. See FRANCIS B.
NYAMNJOH, AFRICA’S MEDIA, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLITICS OF BELONGING 25-28
(2005) (describing the complex fabric of political relevant communal relationships that
characterize most African societies). Within any federal system, the salience of
geographically clustered subnational political communities will be a matter of degree.
89. This is where socio-political variables become interrelated with the issue of
institutional design. A federal system that wishes to use subnational constitutionalism as
a means of accommodating subnational group self-determination, must ensure that it
crafts subnational constitutional space that corresponds to issues relevant to the groups
involved. In South Africa, for example, although the provinces are not permitted to
include a meaningful bill of rights in their constitutions, they are permitted to provide for
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model invariably requires that subnational units have the independence
necessary to entrench meaningful portions of their “fundamental values,”
most likely by adopting customized rights provisions and recognizing
traditional leadership, language, and nationhood.
The obvious tension in this model is between granting subnational
units adequate space for self-determination without destroying the unity
of the overall federal regime.90 From the standpoint of positive political
theory, subnational constitutionalism may be a valuable tool in
maintaining that delicate balance because it can reduce the costs to selfdetermination that subnational polities must pay when joining a federal
system. A federal system that allows for subnational constitutionalism
provides an additional layer of independence for subnational polities,
which can provide additional incentives for those communities to
embrace a federal system.91
This model finds obvious application in ethnically divided federal
systems. The Nigerian federal arrangement that existed between 1960
and 1966 (the First Republic) provides a helpful example.92 During the
First Republic, Nigeria was divided into three regions, each of which was
controlled by a different ethnic majority.93 Integral to the federal scheme
was the fact that each region had the authority to adopt its own
constitution.94 This was considered an important aspect of independence
for the dominant ethnic groups.95 Indeed, after the First Republic fell
apart on account of conflict between the competing ethnic groups, the
next set of Nigerian constitution makers were emphatic that subnational
units not have the authority to adopt their own constitutions.96 They

the “institution, role, status, and authority” of a “traditional monarch.” S. AFR. CONST.
1996 § 143. While this constitutional competency may seem only symbolic, it is
incredibly important for the self-determination of the Zulu nation. See generally
COURTNEY JUNG, THEN I WAS BLACK: SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL IDENTITIES IN
TRANSITION 40-75 (2000) (discussing significance of Zulu monarch). Thus, even though
South Africa’s subnational constitutional space is rather limited, it effectively operates
under the demos model because it was carefully crafted to correspond to the groups
involved.
90. Tarr, supra note 54, at 783-84.
91. See Marshfield, supra note 8, at 621-28 (discussing how subnational
constitutionalism helped to consolidate South Africa’s democracy in this way during the
transition from apartheid to democracy).
92. See generally Rotimi T. Suberu, Institutions, Political Culture, and
Constitutionalism in Nigeria, in POLITICAL CULTURE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 197, 197-218 (Daniel P. Franklin & Michael J. Baun eds.,
1995) (providing helpful summary of constitutional structure during First and Second
Nigerian Republics).
93. See HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 603.
94. See Jinadu, supra note 2, at 163-64.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 164.
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concluded that subnational constitutions were “divisive.”97 Nigeria’s
democratic future, they argued, depended on each citizen viewing
himself primarily as a Nigerian, and the “existence of state constitutions
was inimical to the unity of the country.”98 Tellingly, the federal
constitution of the Second Nigerian Republic (1979-83) maintained
significant decentralization of political power to subnational units, but
expressly prohibited subnational units from adopting their own
constitutions.99
The Nigerian experience simply illustrates the capacity of
subnational constitutions to realize the norm of group self-determination;
even when group self-determination is destructive to the unity and
stability of the overall federal system. Group self-determination
represents one coherent account of why a federal system may introduce
subnational constitutions into the federal structure.
B.

The Federalist Model of Subnational Constitutionalism

The demos model is most appropriate where federal regimes are
comprised of geographically consolidated subnational polities.
Subnational constitutions may, however, be desirable even in more
homogenous federal regimes. The federalist model starts with the
normative assumption that to protect individual liberty, government
powers must not be consolidated in the same hands, but must be divided
among institutions and levels of government.100 By dividing powers,
institutions and levels of government have incentives to monitor and
check each other’s abuses of power. In this way, a federal system can
help to ensure that constitutional restrictions on governmental power are

97.

Id. (quoting statement by Chief R.O.A. Akinjide as recorded in the PROCEEDINGS
vol. 1, Nov. 16, 1977, at 782-83).
98. Jindau, supra note 2, at 165 (citing REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTING
COMMITTEE, vol 1, at iv).
99. Jindau, supra note 2, at 163. Other examples of this model include Iraq,
Malaysia, Switzerland, India’s constitutional allotment for Kashmir, Ethiopia, and South
Africa. See generally Tarr, surpa note 60, at 3 (discussing federal systems created for the
purpose of pluralism); see Ashley S. Deeks and Matthew D. Burton, Iraq’s Constitution:
A Drafting History, 40 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 1 (2007) (discussing Iraq’s federal structure).
100. This model of subnational constitutionalism is most completely developed by
Professor Gardner in the context of state constitutionalism within the United States. See
GARDNER, supra note 16, at 80-143. As discussed in Part IV.C, the federalist model does
not seem to provide a complete account of state constitutionalism. Nevertheless,
Professor Gardner’s exposition of the theoretical relationship between federalism’s
liberty-protecting role and state constitutionalism provides another coherent justification
for subnational constitutionalism.
OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY,
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realized and individual liberty protected. This, of course, is simply a
recantation of Madison’s classic justification of American federalism.101
The federalist model contends that subnational constitutions can
perform three unique functions in this checks-and-balances scheme.
First, because subnational constitutions are entrenched and supreme,
citizens can protect themselves against subnational government tyranny
by enacting individual rights protections that may not be provided by the
national constitution. Although these provisions will not likely restrain
the actions of the national government, they provide an effective means
of checking otherwise permissible subnational government action.102
Second, subnational constitutionalism can allow subnational units to
organize and reorganize their institutions in ways that will be most
efficient, less corrupt, and more supportive of liberty. This includes
structuring institutions so that they are less likely to infringe on negative
rights, but it also includes the structuring of institutions so that they are
effective in protecting and administering any positive liberties that a
subnational unit may recognize and pursue.103
Third, subnational constitutions can provide judges with an
independent means of protecting individuals against excessive state
action. In a layered constitutional system where both national and
subnational constitutions contain individual rights guarantees, judges can
develop independent bodies of constitutional law.104 For example, if a
court were to narrowly construe a national constitutional rights provision,
that precedent is not necessarily binding or even persuasive regarding the
meaning of an applicable subnational constitutional provision that
remains within the system’s subnational constitutional space.105 In this
way, subnational constitutions can provide a “double source”106 of
protections against undesirable government action.

101. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 46, 47, 51 (James Madison). The normative
assumption in this model is that individual “liberty” is a good in itself.
102. See Earl M. Maltz, Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of Federalism, 496
ANNALS 98 (1988) (characterizing state constitutions in this way); Earl M. Maltz, The
Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995 (1985) (same).
103. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999) (discussing how state
constitutions play a central role in the protection of positive rights within the U.S. federal
system).
104. See Williams, supra note 66, at 353 (discussing this function vis-à-vis state
constitutionalism in the U.S.).
105. Id. Obviously jurisdictional rules will likely limit the reach and significance of
rulings based on subnational constitutions. The point, however, is that by allowing
subnational units to adopt positive law that is supreme and entrenched, federal systems
provide a further mechanism for checking government authority.
106. William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977).
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It would seem that the federalist model operates most effectively
when subnational units are permitted to establish their own judiciaries
with ultimate authority for interpreting subnational constitutions.107 This
sort of subnational constitutional space would presumably encourage
subnational judges to interpret their own constitutions independently
from any analogous national laws that may not provide optimal
individual protections.108 The model can operate effectively under an
integrated judiciary, however, if the judiciary enjoys “effective autonomy
and integrity” from the national government.109
Germany provides a helpful example of this model.110 Germany
consists of sixteen subnational units called Länder.111 Each of these has
its own written constitution, parliament, judiciary, and executive.112
Germany’s national constitution (the Basic Law) contains a general antidiscrimination clause that prohibits discrimination based on, among other
things, religion, homeland, or place of origin.113 Nevertheless, five of the
Länder have adopted more stringent constitutional guarantees for
recognized minorities.114 These subnational constitutional guarantees
ensure that the Länder provide equal educational, cultural, vocational,
and political opportunities for minorities.115 Significantly, similar
provisions have been proposed as amendments to the Basic Law, but
those proposals were rejected by the federal parliament.116
In addition to those additional rights protections, the Länder have
used their constitutions to make various structural changes aimed at
making government more responsive and accountable. They have
amended their constitutions to include provisions allowing for public

107. See Watts, supra note 30, at 956 (discussing affect of consolidated judiciary on
subnational units’ ability to develop independent bodies of constitutional law).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See generally Michael J. Baun, The Federal Republic of Germany, in POLITICAL
CULTURE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 79, 79-97 (Daniel P.
Franklin & Michael J. Baun eds., 1995) (describing Germany’s basic constitutional
institutions). The United States is another obvious example. See infra Part IV.C.2
(discussing the federalist model and state constitutionalism).
111. See Norman Weiss, The Protection of Minorities in a Federal State: The Case of
Germany, in FEDERALISM, SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, AND MINORITY RIGHTS 73, 75
(G. Alan Tarr, et al. eds. 2004).
112. Id. The Länder’s judicial competencies are complex. The Länder courts have
limited jurisdiction regarding individual rights issues and all Länd decisions are
ultimately reviewed by one of the two highest federal courts. See JOHN MERRYMAN, ET
AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 565 (1994)
(providing summary of Germany’s court structure).
113. Weiss, supra note 111, at 78.
114. Id. at 80-83.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 77-78.
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referenda and to list specific “goals for state activity.”117 Thus, the
Länder constitutions continue to provide an independent means of
protecting liberty by developing relevant individual rights and ensuring
that government institutions are accountable and efficient.118
IV. TOWARD A DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY MODEL OF SUBNATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM
This section argues for a third model of subnational
constitutionalism. It does not contend that the demos or federalist
models are wrong as theoretical possibilities. Rather, the claim is that
based on the institutional description of subnational constitutionalism
defended above, subnational constitutionalism is uniquely suited to serve
a third, independent purpose: it can promote political deliberation and
participation within subnational units and the federal system as a whole.
On this view, subnational constitutions need not be justified as a
reflection of an underlying subnational polity (demos model) or an
additional mechanism for checking government authority (federalist
model).
Instead, subnational constitutions can be viewed as a
mechanism for encouraging and formalizing popular input in an ongoing
multi-dimensional constitutional deliberation. The section first discusses
the normative claims underlying the deliberative democracy tradition and
then explores how subnational constitutionalism can promote those
principles.
A.

Deliberative Ideals and Civic Republicanism

Contemporary theories of deliberative democracy are linked to a
civic republican approach to politics. Civic republicanism has many
variations and “there is no unitary approach that can be described as
republican.”119
Republican ideals are most frequently traced to

117. Tarr, supra note 60, at 9; see also Arthur B. Gunlicks, Land Constitutions in
Germany, 28 PUBLIUS 105 (1998).
118. Id.
119. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L. J. 1539, 1547
(1988) (providing detailed description of civic republican principles). There is much
literature discussing the civic republican tradition and deliberative democracy. A few
important examples include Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in
THE GOOD POLITY: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 17, 17-34 (Alan Hamlin & Philip
Pettit, eds. 1989); JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION (1991); AMY
GUTMAN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT: WHY MORAL
CONFLICT CANNOT BE AVOIDED IN POLITICS, AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 12
(1996) (providing a list of important authorities on deliberative democracy); Frank
Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Paul Brest, Further Beyond the
Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1623 (1988).
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Aristotle.120 Classic republicanism emphasized the contextualization of
individual citizens. All citizens are “fundamentally situated” within
communities, organizations, and cultures.121 The relationship between
individuals and institutions is reflexive.
Institutions influence
individuals, and individuals shape and mold institutions.
Civic
republicanism is addressed to defining the role that the state should play
in mediating this powerful interaction between individual and
community.122
Contemporary republican theories are perhaps best understood by
contrasting them with their antonym: liberalism.123 Liberalism prioritizes
the preservation and realization of individual interests. It views the state
as a neutral mediator between competing individual interests. Thus,
citizens participate politically by voicing and pursing their own selfinterest, and politics is viewed as a competition between those interests.
The competition is resolved by allowing representative interest-groups to
compete for political power. The state operates as a neutral mediator
and, in order to maximize individual liberty, societal conflicts are
resolved by aggregating “self-regarding” preferences.124 Thus, on a
liberal view, a properly functioning political system is one that achieves
a power-equilibrium between competing interest-groups.
This
equilibrium is reflected in legislation or other popular outputs that
accurately reflect the balance of power between competing interests.125
Civic republicanism views politics and the role of the state from a
different perspective. It asserts that politics is primarily about the
realization of some “common good.” Politics is not simply the
aggregation of individual self-interests. It is about what is best for
society as a whole. Individual political participation involves a sense of
stewardship for society and not simply the registering of private selfinterest. Politics, therefore, is about locating and pursing a conception of
120. See, e.g., Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The
Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 HARV. SUP. CT. REV. 341, 401 (1985)
(discussing Aristotle and the civic republican tradition).
121. S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.
U. L. REV. 685, 704 (1991).
122. Id.
123. But see Sunstein, supra note 119, at 1566-77 (arguing that liberalism and
republicanism are not mutually exclusive and that they are opposites only if liberalism is
presented as caricature of its true nature).
124. See Hoke, supra note 121, at 705 (citing A. CAWSON, CORPORATISM AND
POLITICAL THEORY 16 (1986) as an example of liberal political theory); see also BRUCE
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10-12 (1980).
125. Sunstein, supra note 119, at 1542-43. Liberalism has at least two normative
virtues or justifications. First, it respects individual preferences by requiring government
to remain neutral and not directly engage in preference-formation. Second, and related to
the first, it constructs significant hurdles to government oppression by demanding that
individual preferences be represented and actualized in government policy. Id.
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what is collectively best for society through the process of public
deliberation. This process is reflexive in the sense that it refines
government policy by elucidating the common good and it
simultaneously tutors citizens in necessary civic virtues.
Civic republicanism is nevertheless grounded on individual liberty.
The public good is ascertained by tapping and channeling individual
knowledge, expertise, and preferences. In this way, individuals realize
their freedom because they achieve self-governance by deliberating over
their conception of the public good. At the same time, the community’s
best interests are also realized through a rich and dynamic deliberative
process.
This theoretical foundation gives rise to at least three fundamental
commitments that characterize most deliberative approaches to politics:
public deliberation, citizen participation, and political equality.126
1.

Public Deliberation

Civic republicanism prioritizes political deliberation over perhaps
any other ideal.
Deliberation has a two-part significance for
republicanism. First, it can elucidate the public good by bringing diverse
perspectives, expertise, and knowledge to bear on what is best for society
as a whole. Second, it can contribute to social cohesion and individual
development by forcing citizens to critically evaluate their self-interested
preferences in light of competing preferences and the collective good. It
brings the promise not only of “better government, but also of better
citizens and healthier communities.”127
Deliberation, as envisioned by republicanism, promotes good
governance because it rejects the idea that the aggregation of private
preferences necessarily reflects what is best for society as a whole or that
all preferences are good. A major problem with liberalism is the reality
that the aggregation of preferences may not represent what is best for
society128 and that some preferences, such as discriminatory preferences,
are objectively bad.129 Liberalism does not allow for political processes
to correct these failures. As Professor Sunstein notes, liberalism is
126. These commitments roughly track the four republican principles that Sunstein
describes. See Sunstein, supra note 119, at 1548-58.
127. Matthew J. Parlow, Civic Republicanism, Public Choice Theory, and
Neighborhood Councils: A New Model for Civic Engagement, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 137,
154 (2008).
128. See John Ferejohn, Instituting Deliberative Democracy, in NOMOS XLII:
DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 75, 82 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds.,
2000) (“with sufficient preference diversity, the aggregative model will generally
produce arbitrary collective choices”).
129. See Sunstein, supra note 119, at 1544 (describing discriminatory preferences as
“objectionable because of their effects in subordinating a social group”).
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“indifferent among preferences, so long as force and fraud are not
involved.”130
Republicanism proposes a solution to these failures by prioritizing
public deliberation.131 Whereas aggregation of individual preferences
can occur in isolation and does not require critical discussion or review
of what is best for society, a system that promotes public deliberation
will foster critical review of individual preferences and discussion of
shared norms.132 Republicanism seeks to encourage “stakeholders” to
come together and share their competing ideas and perspectives.133 This
process is believed to draw out otherwise elusive common values and
help to identify norms that transcend self-interest.134 Deliberative
processes can also subject objectionable preferences to critical public
evaluation based on those transcendent norms, rather than simply
registering objectionable norms on equal terms with desirable
preferences.135
It is important to note that deliberative ideals are not necessarily
inconsistent with representative government.136 Although, as discussed
below, deliberative ideals prize direct citizen participation, deliberation
between representatives can serve some of the same purposes.137 The
crucial point is that deliberative bodies must be inclusive and adequately
reflect all reasonable viewpoints within society. If representative bodies
130. Id.
131. Some theorists question whether deliberation is a viable solution to the problems
created by aggregation. See, e.g., Jack Knight & James Johnson, Aggregation and
Deliberation: On the Possibility of Democratic Legitimacy, 22 POL. THEORY 277, 278
(1994) (stating that “we also are deeply skeptical about whether deliberation of the sort
that Dewey and other, more contemporary, theorists envision can remedy the problems
they attribute to aggregative democratic institutions”).
132. See Sunstein, supra note 119, at 1575 n.201 (“differences of opinion and jarring
of parties can promote deliberation”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
133. Parlow, supra note 127, at 153.
134. See id. at 153-54 (stating “deliberation may reveal . . . norms greater than selfinterest: the public good”).
135. See Sunstein, supra note 119, at 1575 n.201. This is not to say that
republicanism holds to a single substantive public good or that all social conflicts can be
resolved through deliberation. Republicanism should not be associated with a
determinate vision of the public good. The public good is contingent upon the needs of
the underlying political community.
136. See Ferejohn, supra note 128, at 79, 96-98 (division of labor is consistent with
deliberative democracy); Sunstein, supra note 119, at 1585-89; cf. Michael A. Fitts, Look
Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on Civic Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1651,
1656 n.24 (1988) (republicanism promotes dialogue by dispersing authority); Michael A.
Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the
Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1988) (evaluating proposals that aim to
promote the public interest).
137. See Ferejohn, supra note 128, at 96-98. One purpose that representation may not
be able to serve is direct education and development of the citizenry, which is a distinct
republican value. See id. at 97.
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are so constituted, deliberations between representatives will similarly
converge on consensus regarding the common good.138
2.

Citizen Participation

Republicanism prioritizes widespread and meaningful political
participation by citizens. Ideally, this means more than just voting. 139
Republicanism aims for citizens to be directly engaged in politics, but
constructive participation can occur through formal and informal
political institutions.
Republicanism values citizen participation for at least three reasons.
First, it ensures the legitimacy of the deliberative process. Because
deliberation is aimed at reaching consensus regarding the common good,
it is essential that all interests and viewpoints be heard. Widespread
participation is the best way to ensure that no voice is excluded and that
the deliberative process has captured all viewpoints and expertise.
Citizen participation is also essential to the deliberative process when
representatives are involved because it serves to limit agency costs by
“monitor[ing] the behavior of representatives in order to limit the risks of
factionalism and self-interested representation.”140 An unengaged
citizenry only enhances agency problems inherent in the representative
system.
Second, citizen participation also helps to educate the citizenry and
enhance communities. Open deliberation forces participants to confront
different ideas and perspectives and to offer justifications for their own
perspectives that others can accept.141 This in turn can develop
participants’ abilities to empathize with competing view points, critically
evaluate their own views, and foster a desire for consensus rather than
domination.142 Communities are consequently strengthened because all
participants have some degree of ownership in political outputs. In that
sense, republicanism views political deliberation by citizens and
representatives as an inherent public good.143
A third, and often overlooked, reason for valuing widespread
participation is that it can fuel deliberation.144 As Madison famously
observed, the more “factions” that exist within a polity, the more difficult
138. See id. at 96-98.
139. See Brest, supra note 119, at 1623; Hoke, supra note 121, at 709.
140. Sunstein, supra note 119, at 1556.
141. See Ferejohn, supra note 128, at 85-86.
142. As noted above, one weakness with representative deliberative democracy is that
it will not necessarily contribute to the education and socialization of individual citizens.
See id. at 97.
143. See Hoke, supra note 121, at 690 n.19 (listing theorists who endorse this view).
144. See Sunstein, supra note 119, at 1575 n.201.
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it is for any one faction to gain absolute control.145 The inability of any
one group to gain control means that groups will have to work towards
agreement. That is, they will have to engage in deliberation regarding
their respective viewpoints and search for shared norms. Thus, if we
assume that increased participation will result in a greater diversity of
viewpoints and interest-groups, the higher the levels of participation, the
greater the incentives for even self-interested factions to engage in
constructive deliberation.146
3.

Political Equality

Republicanism demands that all citizens and groups are able to
participate in the political process equally. The republican vision of
deliberation as a refining process for political outputs depends on
political equality. The virtues of public deliberation are short-circuited if
all viewpoints and members are not able to contribute to the discussion.
This means that the deliberative process must be structured such that
minority viewpoints can have a meaningful voice in the discussion.147 It
also means that, contrary to traditional conceptions of republicanism, the
ideology is compatible with, and perhaps dependent upon, a commitment
to cultural pluralism.148 A complete representation of all viewpoints is
necessary for the deliberative process to awaken the community to the
“true needs of the collective whole.”149
B.

Deliberative Ideals and Subnational Constitutionalism

The overall normative claim of deliberative democrats is that a
community of active political participants deliberating over solutions to
social problems is better than a political system that simply generates
authoritative outputs by aggregating individual expressions of self-

145. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). Madison argued that larger
populations are less susceptible to majoritarian abuse because they will inevitably contain
a diversity of factions that will prevent one dominant majority from oppressing
minorities. See id. The assumption underlying Madison’s argument is that the more
viewpoints or factions that have a voice in the political arena, the harder it will be for one
voice to squelch out all others. See id.
146. See Parlow, supra note 127, at 156 (discussing how “interest-groups” can
actually be good for civic republicanism).
147. See Sunstein, supra note 119, at 1585-88 (concluding that equality is the primary
concern for institutional design because providing access to all groups will result in a
constructive deliberation that will converge on the common good).
148. See Hoke, supra note 121, at 707.
149. Parlow, supra note 127, at 155.
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interest.150 Deliberative democracy is nevertheless an ideal. Some
conflicts will not be resolvable by deliberation, and government action
will nevertheless be necessary.151 Some viewpoints will, perhaps, need
to be excluded from the conversation.152 Thus, as a practical matter,
deliberative democrats are not concerned with the deliberative purity of
any particular regime. They are realistically concerned only with “how
much of the full-blown deliberative ideal can be accomplished or
encouraged by suitably designed institutions.”153 The all important
practical question for a regime that values deliberative ideals is how to
design political institutions that will provide incentives for political
participation and constructive deliberation.
The claim here is that federal systems that provide for subnational
constitutionalism can afford better incentives for political participation
and constructive deliberation than federal systems that do not provide for
subnational constitutionalism.
Subnational constitutionalism can
promote deliberative ideals in two ways. First, it can ensure that popular
constitutional opinions are not excluded from the evolution of
constitutional norms. Second, it can provide independent incentives for
public political participation and reduce costs associated with political
participation.
1.

Public Deliberation and Constitutional Content

Proponents of deliberative democracy have noted that a major
challenge facing constitutional democracies is the limited opportunities
that these systems generally provide for public deliberation and
participation regarding constitutional issues.154 This is not only an
empirical problem. It represents an ideological conflict between
constitutionalism and deliberative democracy.155 Constitutionalism is
150. See, e.g., Hoke, supra note 121, at 690 n.19; Ferejohn, supra note 128, at 75;
Timothy L. Fort, The First Man and the Company Man: The Common Good,
Transcendence, and Mediating Institutions, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 391, 397 (1999).
151. See Ferejohn, supra note 128, at 75-82 (discussing need for institutions that force
communities to make timely decisions in an efficient manner).
152. See Sunstein, supra note 119 (arguing that some viewpoints are properly
excluded because they do not offer public-regarding justifications); Ferejohn, supra note
128, at 77 (arguing that only “reasonable” views should be allowed in the dialogue).
153. Ferejohn, supra note 128, at 76.
154. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER F. ZURN, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE
INSTITUTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 265 (2007); John J. Worley, Deliberative
Constitutionalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 431 (2009).
155. See Worley, supra note 154, at 431-34 (considering whether constitutionalism
and deliberative democracy can be reconciled); Samuel Freeman, Deliberative
Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 371, 417 (2000) (suggesting
the tension between constitutionalism and deliberative democracy requires additional
clarification).
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often described as being “committed to the idea that individuals have
certain rights—freedom of speech and religion, equality before the law, a
right to own private property, and so on—that lie beyond the scope of
legitimate government action.”156 Yet, the core of the deliberative ideal
is that political conflicts should be resolved by public deliberation that
results in reasoned consensus.157 This includes moral conflicts regarding
which rights should receive constitutional protection and the scope of
those rights.158 Similarly, constitutionalism recognizes that institutions
must be stable, predictable, and entrenched beyond the realm of ordinary
political deliberation. Deliberative democracy, on the other hand, asserts
that policy decisions as well as the best procedures and institutional
arrangements for making those policy decisions should be subject to
deliberation.159
One solution to this apparent contradiction is to point to the fact that
deliberative democracy recognizes that rights related to equal political
access are fundamental to the deliberative process and should be beyond
the realm of political deliberation.160 This solution does not resolve the
whole conflict, however, because there are many rights commonly
accepted as fundamental that do not have a tight nexus with equal
political participation.161 Similarly, although deliberative democrats may
accept that the organs and processes of government must be relatively
stable in order for government to function efficiently, they contend that

156. See Worley, supra note 154, at 454-55; see id. at 432 n.3 (listing RONALD
DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2324 (1996) and LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 4 (1985), as examples of
this version of constitutionalism).
157. See Worley, supra note 154, at 432.
158. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?
41-43 (2004) (explaining why deliberation is the preferred means for resolving moral
conflict).
159. See Worley, supra note 154, at 431 (noting disagreement among democratic
theorists regarding the “legal, political, and social institutions those [democratic] ideals
require”); GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 158, at 132 (“Deliberative democracy
does not seek a foundational principle or set of principles that, in advance of actual
political activity, determines whether a procedure or law is justified. Instead, it adopts a
dynamic conception of political justification, in which change over time is an essential
feature of justifiable principles.”).
160. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of
Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (1990); see Hoke, supra note 121,
at 707 n.96 (providing further examples of republican theorists that “embrace political
equality as a prerequisite for substantive and procedural fairness.”). As Sunstein has
noted, republican arguments that political equality is fundamental to the political process
bear striking resemblance to arguments by procedural democrats, such as John H. Ely.
See Sunstein, supra note 119, at 1552 n.63 (citing JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (2002)).
161. See Worley, supra note 154, at 464.
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deliberation regarding public institutions can foster improvements to
institutional design.162
There have been many theoretical attempts to resolve this
conflict.163 This Article does not enter that theoretical debate. Rather, it
argues that subnational constitutionalism offers a valuable practical
compromise to this problem. Subnational constitutionalism offers the
possibility of proliferating local access to public deliberation regarding
constitutional issues without compromising the idea of pre-legal
fundamental rights or necessary institutional stability.
Constitutionalism is an impediment to public deliberation because it
effectively removes constitutional issues from public political
processes.164 This problem is exasperated in federal systems that do not
allow for subnational constitutionalism.
Although constitutional
amendment at any level generally requires public input, national
constitutions tend to be far more static and difficult to amend than
subnational constitutions.165
This is not merely a coincidence.
Incentives for national constitutional stability are strong.
In a recent article, Eric Posner and Tom Ginsburg conclude that the
fundamental difference between subnational constitutionalism and
national constitutionalism is that subnational constitutions involve
mitigated agency costs.166 Posner and Ginsburg conclude that agency
costs are far greater at the national level because: (1) national
constitutions must place limits on theoretically unlimited government
power, but subnational constitutions already operate within a legally
defined space; (2) there is no effective enforcement mechanism operating
above the national constitution, but national government provides
effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms regarding subnational
abuses; and (3) subnational units risk losing citizens to neighboring
units.167
Because agency costs are reduced at the subnational level, Posner
and Ginsburg conclude that there is an inevitable disparity in
constitutional stability between “states” and “substates.”168 High agency
costs mean that national constitutional constraints must be relatively
strong, static, and difficult to change.169 Subnational constitutions,
however, can be more fluid and responsive to public input because

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 158, at 132.
See Worley, supra note 154, at 433 n.6 (listing authorities).
See id. at 431-34.
See Dinan, supra note 34, at 841-47.
See Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 18, at 1584-85.
See id. at 1596-97.
See id. at 1593-94.
Id.
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agency costs are lower.170 The basic intuition is that there are strong
incentives for a national constitution to be stable in its creation of core
government institutions and protection of essential individual liberties.
Furthermore, a stable national constitution creates a safe place for
subnational units to engage in constitutional experimentation because
inappropriate experiments will be corrected by enforcement of the
national constitution’s overarching rules.171
Posner and Ginsburg’s hypothesis has compelling empirical
support. In all federal systems that permit subnational constitutionalism,
subnational constitutions are easier to amend172 and amended more
frequently than their overarching national constitution.173
The important implication of this hypothesis is that within federal
systems governed only by a national constitution, incentives for stability
and high agency costs will result in arduous amendment procedures.174
This will result in necessary constitutional change occurring primarily
through judicial interpretation of the national constitution.175 That sort of
“informal amendment” through judicial interpretation effectively
forecloses recurring and meaningful public access to the processes of
constitutional change. Thus, in a single-constitution federal system,
public access points regarding constitutional change are essentially nonexistent. In other words, participation costs regarding constitutional
change in a single-constitution federal regime are infinite.

170. Id.
171. See Harry L. Witte, Rights, Revolution, and the Paradox of Constitutionalism:
The Processes of Constitutional Change in Pennsylvania, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 383, 475
(1993) (concluding regarding U.S. federal system that “[O]ur federalism permits vigorous
popular democracy to operate in the states because the Federal Constitution places checks
on majoritarian excesses.”).
172. See Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 18, at 1600 (“Available evidence seems
consistent with this conjecture. We know of no subconstitutional system that is more
difficult to amend than that of its superstate”).
173. See Dinan, supra note 33, at 841-43 (discussing ease of amendment and
amendment rates in subnational units). South Africa represents somewhat of an
exception to this rule because only two provinces have adopted constitutions and only the
province of the Western Cape has survived review by the Constitutional Court.
174. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, AM. POL.
SCI. REV., Jun. 1994, 355, 355-70 (arguing that constitutional change is necessary in any
system and if amendment procedures are arduous, change will likely occur through
judicial review); see Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 18, at 1600 (“Informal amendment
takes place when political norms change, or courts (possibly responding to political
pressures) “interpret” or construct the constitution so as to bring it in line with policy
preferences. If our theory is correct, a state that becomes a substate will weaken its de
jure amendment procedures. But this weakening could also take place in a de facto
sense, if the courts and political culture become more willing to ignore rigid
constitutional constraints, in which case the de jure rules might be left undisturbed.”).
175. Lutz, supra note 174, at 355-70.
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A federal system that incorporates subnational constitutionalism,
however, can accommodate varying degrees of constitutional stability.
Subnational constitutionalism ensures that at least some constitutional
issues can be subject to more public mechanisms of constitutional
revision. It creates the possibility that the national constitution will be
rigid and subject to revision through procedures that invite less public
deliberation, such as judicial review, while subnational constitutions can
be more fluid, easily amended, and will invite more frequent public
deliberation regarding constitutional content.
Consider how these principles might actually play out in practice.
The substantive and democratic contingency of subnational constitutions
allows federal regimes to constitutionalize those rights that the national
community can identify as fundamental and beyond the realm of
legitimate government action. Those rights presumably represent the
bare minimum protections that the national community as a whole can
agree on.
In a dual-constitutional federal system, unsettled or
unanticipated rights that are not included in the national constitution need
not be left exclusively to future judicial interpretation of the national
constitution, but can be placed within the “constitutional space” of the
subnational units. Subnational constitutional law operates as a “safe”
environment for public input regarding rights because the society’s core
values remain relatively static and protected by the national constitution.
Regarding government structure, although the national government
must settle on stable institutions and cannot allow the structure of those
institutions to be constantly debated and revised, national institutional
stability can make subnational instability less pressing. National
constitutions can ensure that certain core functions are channeled through
stable national institutions. They can also institute legal parameters
regarding the degree of institutional variance that subnational units can
explore. Those measures can create a safe arena for subnational units to
experiment with reasonable deviation from federal institutional designs.
In these ways, subnational constitutionalism can promote at least
three types of deliberation. First, it can facilitate direct public
deliberation regarding unsettled rights and improved structural
arrangements because each subnational unit will have the opportunity to
make its own constitutional decisions regarding those issues. Second, it
can promote a form of deliberation between subnational units as each
unit takes a particular position regarding issues within their constitutional
space. Subnational units can, according to civic republican assumptions,
learn from each other’s experiences. That new data can inform the
internal debate within each subnational unit and provide the catalyst for
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constitutional progress.176 Third, they can promote a constructive
system-wide dialogue between the public and the political branches of
government on one hand, and the judiciary on the other hand.
Subnational constitutionalism allows the public direct access to the
processes of identifying and defining rights and organizing and
restructuring government. Those public inputs can inform judicial
review of those issues and vice-versa.
This deliberative model developed here represents one constructive
practical compromise regarding the conflict between constitutionalism
and republican ideals. Constitutional ideals remain intact because certain
basic rights and structural parameters are outside the bounds of any
government action. Deliberative ideals remain intact because unsettled
rights and institutional arrangements are not finally decided at the
national level, but are left to public deliberation within and between
subnational units. In this way, subnational constitutionalism can make a
federal regime a safer place to deliberate because not all constitutional
issues will be open to public discussion.177 At the same time, it can make
a federal regime more deliberative because some constitutional issues
will remain within the realm of public political choice.
2.

Subnational Constitutionalism and Incentives for Public
Participation

Proponents of deliberative democracy recognize that public
deliberation is more likely to occur if citizens have meaningful and
relatively cheap points of access to the political process.178 The basic
idea is to increase opportunities for cheap public input regarding

176. This second scenario draws on Justice Brandeis’ “laboratory of the states”
analogy. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism and Public Choice, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 207, 207-33 (Anne O’Connell & Dan
Farber eds., Edward Elgar Publishing 2010) (explaining Justice Brandeis’ theory in terms
of information sharing).
177. Posner and Ginsburg’s agency model of subconstitutions provides additional
insight here. They suggest that the fundamental difference between subnational
constitutionalism and national constitutionalism is that subnational constitutions operate
under the protection of the national constitution. Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 18, at
1583-85. Applying agency theory, Posner and Ginsburg conclude that agency costs are
far greater at the national level because there is no effective enforcement mechanism
operating above the national constitution. Id. Subnational constitutional space, however,
is directly enforced in domestic courts. This means that subnational constitutions need
not be as static or “conservative” in their content as the national constitution because
abuses of power are subject to an effective correction mechanism, i.e. judicial review.
Id.; see also Witte, supra note 171, at 475.
178. See Parlow, supra note 127, at 156; Fitts, supra note 136, at 1656.
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meaningful issues.179 Institutions should be designed to “proliferate the
points of access to government.”180 In this regard, subnational
constitutionalism can uniquely facilitate public deliberation in at least the
following ways.
a.

Democratic Scale and Political Participation

The political science literature discussing the relationship between
jurisdiction size and public participation is vast and contested.181
However, there is solid evidence that citizen participation tends to
increase as jurisdiction size decreases.182 What is striking about the
literature from a republican perspective is that voting rates do not seem
to significantly increase as jurisdiction size decreases.183 Rather, as
jurisdiction size decreases, citizens tend to engage in “thicker” kinds of
public participation—such as contacting officials, attending hearings, or
even running for public office.184 Leading studies have concluded that
these thicker forms of participation are not limited to extremely small
political communities such as towns or counties. Eric Oliver, for
example, has found that thicker participation increases even in larger
communities of up to one million people.185 Another study found that in
the U.S., citizens are more likely to contact their elected state
representative than their federal representative.186
The general explanation for this increase in thicker participation is
that “reducing the size of constituencies and increasing the number of
officials greatly reduces the costs of such activity.”187 A further
179. A separate issue facing deliberative theorists is access to political information.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Republicanism and the Preference Problem, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
181, 185-87 (1990) (“A central point here, highly congenial to the republican tradition, is
that preferences are shifting and endogenous rather than exogenous—endogenous to, or a
function of, current information, consumption patterns, legal rules, and social pressures
most generally.”). The concern here is with opportunities for the public to engage the
political system.
180. Sunstein, supra note 119, at 1586 (greater access is valuable because it increases
“the ability of diverse groups to influence policy, multiplies perspectives in government,
and improves deliberative capacities.”).
181. Hills, supra note 1766, at 219-32.
182. Id. at 221-25.
183. Id. at 223.
184. Id.
185. Id. (citing ERIC J. OLIVER, DEMOCRACY IN SUBURBIA 42-52 (2001)); see also
ROBERT DAHL & EDWARD TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 62-65 (1973) (similar finding
regarding smaller communities in Sweden).
186. Hills, supra note 176, at 223 (citing SIDNEY VERBA, ET AL., VOICE AND
EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1994)).
187. Hills, supra note 176, at 223 (citing DALH & TUFTE, supra note 185; Daniel J.
Elazar, Cured by Bigness: Toward a Post-Technocratic Federalism, in THE FEDERAL
POLITY 272, 273 (Daniel J. Elazar, ed. 1973)).

1188

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115:4

explanation is that citizens tend to feel more “efficacious and
knowledgeable when engaging in thick participation in smaller
jurisdictions, and they are more likely to be recruited by neighbors and
generally participate in mobilizing networks in smaller jurisdictions.”188
From a republican perspective, this evidence suggests that
decentralization increases not only the quantity of participation, but also
the quality. In smaller jurisdictions, citizens appear more likely to
contact representatives regarding policy-specific concerns and participate
directly in public forums.189 This increased issue-specific participation
makes richer public deliberation possible not only between citizens, but
also between representatives. Greater citizen communication with
representatives presumably reduces agency costs associated with
representation. As representatives become more informed of their
constituency’s issue-specific view points, they are better equipped to
voice those concerns and less able to ignore them. Increased interaction
of this sort can facilitate a more informed and inclusive public
deliberation even at the representative level.190 The implications of this
for subnational constitutionalism should be clear: by decentralizing
constitutional issues, a federal regime is able to facilitate both a higher
quality and quantity of public deliberation regarding those important
issues.191
b.

Real Power and Incentives for Participation

Notwithstanding reduced participation costs, constructive
deliberation will not occur unless citizens and their representatives are
motivated to engage in meaningful deliberation.192 The poor voting rates
in the U.S. illustrate this point powerfully.193 The costs of voting in the
U.S. are relatively nominal, yet the instrumental incentives to vote are
weak. The chances of a single vote materially affecting any election, yet
alone a particular substantive policy, are miniscule. The result is low

188.
189.

Hills, supra note 176, at 223 (citing OLIVER, supra note 185, at 61-65).
Hills, supra note 176, at 223 (citing SIDNEY VERBA, ET AL., VOICE AND
EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1994)).
190. Indeed, there is evidence that representative bodies for smaller jurisdictions have
a higher proportion of minority representatives than larger jurisdictions. See Deborah
Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1988) (presenting and analyzing evidence).
191. See generally Rapaczynski, supra note 120, at 402-05 (discussing evidence
regarding size and participation in state government).
192. Hills, supra note 176, at 225.
193. See Steven L. Winter, When Self-Governance is a Game, 67 BROOK. L. REV.
1171, 1202 (2002) (“Throughout most of the twentieth century, voting rates in the United
States were much lower than in almost all other advanced democracies.”).
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voter turn out. Those who vote apparently do so for non-instrumental
reasons such a moral belief in voting as a civic duty.
As the voting phenomenon in the U.S. illustrates, the challenge of
institutional design is to provide cheap access to forms of political
participation that the public will be motivated to take advantage of. One
familiar strategy is to ensure that the public’s political access points
concern important issues and that deliberating bodies have real power to
decide those issues.194 As Gerald Frug, a prominent local government
scholar, claims, “no one is likely to participate in the decisionmaking of
an entity of any size unless that participation will make a
difference. . . .”195 There is empirical support for this postulate. Citizens
are more likely to mobilize when the issues involved are significant to
them and their participation will make a difference.196 There are at least
three ways that subnational constitutionalism may help to mobilize
political participation in this way.197
First, constitutional issues, especially issues regarding individual
rights, tend to solicit significant public interest and mobilize grassroots
political participation. Disputes over rights issues tend to mobilize
citizen-based groups rather than industry-based groups because they
generally implicate moral, cultural, or religious preferences.198
Additionally, citizen-based groups rely on political strategies that aim to
mobilize large numbers of citizens from diverse ideological backgrounds
around a single issue.199 They do this through grassroot mediums such as
194. Parlow, supra note 127, at 174 n. 151.
195. Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1070
(1980).
196. Hills, supra note 176, at 228-29 (citing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER
HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL
FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001)).
197. Providing subnational units with meaningful constitutional authority presents a
now familiar problem for deliberative constitutionalism: how can authority for
fundamental issues such as institutional design and individual rights be devolved to cheap
points of political access without undermining the essential benefits of constitutionalism
itself? Again, subnational constitutionalism provides a practical solution to the tension
between constitutional and deliberative ideals. If deliberation regarding constitutional
issues is inherently valuable, then the introduction of subnational constitutions into a
federal system capitalizes on the participatory benefits of decentralization by allowing
subnational units to engage certain constitutional issues without comprising the overall
stability of the federal system.
198. See Marvin Krislov & Daniel M. Katz, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, 17
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 295 (presenting significant data regarding direct democracy
initiatives in the U.S., including data regarding signature campaigns and other grass roots
forms of political activity); see also Elizabeth Garret & Elisabeth R. Gerber, Money in the
Initiative and Referendum Process: Evidence of Its Effects and Prospects for Reform, in
THE BATTLE OF CITIZEN LAWMAKING 73, 73 (M. Dane Waters, ed. 2001) (concluding that
special interest do not ultimately control direct democracy in state politics).
199. Hills, supra note 176, at 224 (citing Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and
Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001)).
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creating local organizational chapters, public demonstrations, and letterwriting campaigns. This suggests that unlike more technical legislative
or administrative matters, rights issues are particularly likely to mobilize
citizen participation. By devolving some rights issues to subnational
units, federal regimes give these subnational units real power to decide
important issues, which sets the stage for greater public participation.200
Second, entrenchment and supremacy provide independent
incentives for greater public participation. Entrenchment and supremacy
mean that the stakes are high when constitutional revision or amendment
is involved. Regardless of the subject matter of a proposed amendment
or provision, the fact that a constitutional provision will be beyond the
reach of ordinary politics provides a strong incentive for all parties with
an interest in a proposed provision to make sure that their voice is heard.
It also means that if a constitutional amendment were a realistic
possibility for a particular group or interest, they would be more likely to
pursue this option than other forms of political participation that could
ultimately be nullified by constitutional amendment. Furthermore, the
fact that subnational constitutions must be endorsed by their respective
subnational communities, and not simply thrust upon them by the
national community, means that there will be some smaller, presumably
more accessible, forum available for subnational opinions to be voiced
regarding constitutional revision.
Third, a separate strategy for fostering citizen participation is based
on the assumption that citizens are mobilized by rival parties or
interests.201 The idea is that diversity can facilitate participation. This
assumption appears to be supported by the evidence. J. Eric Oliver has
found that, within local politics, higher levels of racial or economic
diversity will result in “thicker” forms of political participation.202
However, subnational constitutionalism does not necessarily lend itself
to this strategy. The determinate fact is demographical: whether
subnational communities are sufficiently diverse to trigger dialogue
between groups and foster participation. It is tempting to believe that
constitutional issues, especially rights issues, can be divisive enough to
200. Structural matters may be less politically controversial than rights issues. They
are nevertheless incredibly important because they establish or alter the framework
within which government will operate. There is evidence that these issues are also likely
to solicit meaningful public participation. See JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION (University Press of Kansas 2009) (2006) (reviewing state
constitutional debates regarding important structural issues); Michael B. Berkman &
Christopher Reenock, Incremental Consolidation and Comprehensive Reorganization of
American State Executive Branches, AM. J. POL. SCI., Oct. 2004, pp 796-812 (discussing
major campaigns within states to re-organize executive branches).
201. Hills, supra note 176, at 226.
202. Id. at 227 (citing OLIVER, supra note 185).
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draw out diversity from otherwise sleepy homogeneous populations.
But, this ultimately depends on the configuration of the underlying
subnational communities and the conventional wisdom is that smaller
jurisdictions tend to be less diverse.203 Nevertheless, because subnational
constitutionalism can reduce participation and agency costs, if the
subnational population is sufficiently diverse, participation may be more
likely within subnational communities than national communities.204
C.

A Brief Comment on State Constitutionalism in the U.S. Federal
System

There is remarkably little literature discussing the normative
justifications for state constitutionalism within the U.S. federal system.205
To the degree that state constitutionalism is evaluated from a normative
perspective, the scholarship closely tracks the demos and federalist
models discussed earlier.
However, as explained below, those
explanations are incomplete in various respects, and a deliberative model
of subnational constitutionalism may be a step towards a more complete
account of contemporary state constitutionalism in the U.S. federal
system.
1.

The Demos Model and State Constitutionalism

Various scholars have attempted to “wrap” state constitutionalism
“in the mantle of state autonomy.”206 This scholarship contends that the
federal system is structured to preserve semi-autonomous state polities
with the authority to separately constitute themselves.207 On this view,
state constitutions are independent sources of fundamental law that
derive legitimacy from their corresponding state polities.208 State
203. Hills, supra note 176, at 226 (discussing relationship between scale and
diversity).
204. Id.
205. Two of the few direct treatments of this question can be found in John Kincaid,
State Constitutions in a Federal System, 496 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 1, 16-18 (Mar. 1988) and Donald S. Lutz, The Purposes
of American State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 27, 31-33
(1982). Professor Gardner also addresses the issue. See GARDNER, supra note 16, 12143.
206. Earl M. Maltz, The Political Dynamics of the New Judicial Federalism, 2
EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 233, 233-34 (1989) (citing Ronald K.L. Collins, The
Once ‘New Judicial Federalism’ and its Critics, 64 WASH. L. REV. 5, 15 (1989), and
Christopher Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of Florida’s
‘Forced Linkage’ Experiment, 39 FLA. L. REV. 653, 679 (1987), as examples of this sort
of scholarship).
207. Maltz, supra note 26, at 233-34.
208. See Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law,
84 VA. L. REV. 389, 396-404 (1998) (summarizing this position). Chief Judge Judith
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constitutions are understood as analogous to constitutions of sovereign
nations in that their legitimacy derives from fifty unique polities with
certain fundamental commitments expressed in their corresponding
constitutions.209
The demos model is an incomplete explanation of the role of state
constitutionalism in the U.S. federal system. First, scholars note that the
demos model fundamentally misconstrues the nature of American
federalism because it assumes that American federalism represents the
confederation of independent sovereigns.210 Most scholars reject this
“compact” theory of American federalism.211 They note that the Union
under the Federal Constitution was the creation of a single polity with the
decentralization of residential powers to the states as subordinate units.212
It was expressly intended to create one American “People.”213 Thus, as
the argument goes, American federalism was not intended to preserve the
rights of subnational groups to realize self-determination through state
constitutions.
Although it is true that American federalism is not properly
characterized as a confederation of independent states, that point alone is
an unconvincing critique of the demos model of state constitutionalism.
Within any federal system, subnational group self-determination is a
matter of degree. The fact that the Federal Constitution creates one
national “people” does not preclude the coexistence of subnational
political identities—of varying degrees of salience—that find expression
in state constitutions.214
Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals is often associated with this position. See Judith
S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 399,
423 (1987).
209. See GARDNER, supra note 16, 56-72 (summarizing this position).
210. See GARDNER, supra note 16, at 60, n.17. This assumption may have been
understandable early in the nation’s founding. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 71 (Penguin 2003) (“in a word, there exist twenty-four small sovereign
nation states which link together to form the body of the Union.”).
211. See Akil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L. J. 1425
(1987).
212. Id. at 1450.
213. As Amar concludes:
It is tempting here simply to invoke the Constitution’s famous first seven
words—’We the People of the United States’—and be done with it. For at first
blush, they seem to furnish irrebuttable proof that the sovereignty of one united
People, instead of thirteen distinct Peoples, provided the new foundation of the
Federalist Constitution. The temptation is all the greater because of the (quite
literal) primacy of these words in the text itself, their centrality in the minds of
both pro- and anti-ratification leaders in the various state conventions, and their
prominence in the early landmark opinions of the Supreme Court.
Id.
214. See supra note 88 (discussing the saliency of subnational political identity as a
matter of degree within federal systems).
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There is, however, a more convincing critique of the demos model.
Various scholars have noted that the nature of American political culture
has changed such that there are no longer meaningful subnational polities
or associations underlying state constitutions.215
Contemporary
American society is simply too transient and nationalistic to support the
“romantic” visions of vibrant subnationalism associated with the demos
model.216 This empirical argument has largely carried the day. Most
theorists recognize that even though certain regions retain some cultural
uniqueness, state boundaries no longer track cultural communities that
are sufficiently consolidated to justify state constitutionalism exclusively
under the demos model.217
2.

The Federalist Model and State Constitutionalism

Because the demos model presents an incomplete normative
justification for state constitutionalism, scholars have offered alternative
theories. Most notably, Professors James Gardner and Paul Kahn have
developed theories of state constitutionalism that can be characterized as
variants of the federalist model discussed above.
According to Kahn, American federalism is intended to preserve a
diversity of courts with authority to interpret the fundamental principles
“of American constitutionalism.”218 On Kahn’s view, state constitutions
serve a federalist function because they provide the pretext for insulating
state constitutional decisions from federal preemption; thus preserving a
diversity of judicial opinions regarding the meaning of core
constitutional principles.219
Kahn expressly rejects that a state
community’s input, rather than the input of its judges, contributes to the
evolution of “American Constitutionalism.”220
Professor Gardner developed a more complicated theory of state
constitutionalism. Like Kahn, he asserts that state constitutions should
not be viewed as isolated and independent sources of constitutional
law.221 Gardner contends that “all American constitutions are drawn
215. See Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 66-72
(2007).
216. Id. at 61-62 (2007) (discussing empirical difficulties with this version of state
constitutionalism).
217. Id. at 52-62; but see BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT 5-10 (2008) (concluding that
local American communities tend to sort themselves along identifiable political lines).
218. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1160 (1993).
219. Id. at 1156.
220. Id. (“State constitutionalism should not . . . splinter the debate over the
possibilities of the rule of law into a Babel of fifty different communities.”).
221. Id. at 1160 (“To rest state constitutionalism on an idea of the state as an already
defined historical community, with a text that can be interpreted to reflect the unique
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from the same set of universal principles of constitutional selfgovernance.”222 According to Gardner, the demos model is in error
because it adopts a positivist223 approach to state constitutions that is
incompatible with this universalist understanding of American
constitutionalism.224
In keeping with this universalist understating, Gardner views state
constitutions as serving two purposes. First, as a legal matter, they are
necessary to establish and limit state government power.225 Second,
because federalism is intended to empower state government to act as a
check on national authority, state constitutions must empower state
government officials and institutions to act as “agents of federalism” that
will seek to counteract national abuses of power on behalf of all
Americans.226 Gardner claims that this Madisonian vision of American
federalism requires that state governments assume an obligation to use
their authority on behalf of all Americans as a means of protecting
against national abuses.227 According to Gardner, because each state
constitution does not correspond to a specific and unique polis, state
constitutions are best viewed as instruments for state judges to use in
pushing back on national abuses.228
On the whole, the federalist model presents a more compelling
account of contemporary state constitutionalism than the demos model.
American federalism is certainly designed to serve a liberty-protecting,
checks-and-balances function, and state constitutions can play an
important role in that regard. However, Gardner and Kahn’s theories are
unconvincing because they discredit state constitutional texts as
meaningful sources of constitutional law.229
political identity of members of that community, is to try to build a serious legal doctrine
on what may be no more than an anachronism or romantic myth.”).
222. James A. Gardner, The Positivist Revolution that Wasn’t: Constitutional
Universalism in the States: 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 109, 117 (1998).
223. Gardner defines positivists as “the Austinian notion that law, far from being
some body of general principles upon which courts and legislators draw, is better
understood as the specific commands of specific sovereigns.” Id. at 121.
224. Id. at 128.
225. Gardner, supra note 16, at 123-32.
226. Id. (“State power exists for the benefit of the people of the state, to be sure, and
state constitutions exist in part to translate the state polity’s wishes into a satisfying plan
of state-level government. But state power also exists for the benefit of the people of the
nation, and it plays a potentially significant role in securing their liberty. . . . My welfare,
in other words, depends not only your shared national constitution and on my state
constitution, but also to some extent on your state constitution as well. State constitutions
are thus linked in a web of constitutional relations created by the national system of
federalism.”).
227. Id. at 122.
228. Gardner, supra note 16, at 123-32.
229. See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90
MICH. L. REV. 761, 822 (1992) (concluding that state constitutions are merely product of
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One of the most striking characteristics of contemporary state
constitutionalism is the “beehive” of political activity that swarms
around state constitutional change.230 State constitutions are amended
frequently.231 More importantly, many amendments are not frivolous in
content. Citizens frequently amend state constitutions with the express
purpose of interjecting on weighty issues such as the scope of “equal
protection,” “due process,” and “probable cause” as well as important
structural issues like the scope of judicial review, executive veto
authority, and agency rule-making authority.232 These amendments
sometimes restrain government action, but they frequently endorse
intrusive state action.233
Gardner and Kahn nevertheless discredit state constitutional politics
because of a normative assumption that “fundamental law” should not
develop in piecemeal through popular political processes.234 But this
assumption should be questioned. As argued above, subnational
constitutions are second-order political institutions. They operate within
random political interjections and not a principled political tradition that “deserves” to be
deemed “constitutional.”); Kahn, supra note 218, at 1156 (“State constitutionalism
should not . . . splinter the debate over the possibilities of the rule of law into a Babel of
fifty different communities. That, however, is exactly the effect of the doctrine of unique
state sources.”).
230. John Kincaid, State Constitutions in the Federal System, AM. ACADEMY OF POL.
& SOC. SCI., Mar. 1998, at 14 (“the realm of state constitutional law is a beehive of
activity”).
231. See generally Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., First Things Last: Amendomania and State
Bills of Rights, 54 MISS. L.J. 223 (1984). The states have collectively submitted 10,105
proposed amendments to voters regarding currently operative state constitutions,
translating into an average of almost four proposed amendments per election year. THE
BOOK OF THE STATES 12-13 (2009) (Table 1.1). This number (10,105) does not include
the estimated 772 amendments to the Alabama constitution that are exclusively local in
nature. See id. Voters have approved 6,645 amendments to their current state
constitutions, translating into an average of over 133 amendments per state constitution.
Id. Again, this number (6,645) does not include local amendments to the Alabama
constitution.
232. See generally THE BOOK OF THE STATES 6 (2009) (Table B) (cataloging
amendments by substantive category).
233. See Janice C. May, Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited, 17
PUBLIUS 153, 178 (1987) (surveying constitutional amendments in the criminal procedure
context and concluding that they can be fairly characterized as both expanding and
contracting rights protections).
234. See Gardner, supra note 229, at 822 (“state constitutions are hard-pressed to
generate epics to give them meaning. When we turn upon state constitutions the narrative
devices we use to create constitutional meaning on the federal level, we find state
constitutions wanting. The stories to which they lend themselves are not stories of
principle and integrity, but stories of expediency and compromise at best, foolishness and
inconstancy at worst. And the poverty of state constitutional discourse merely reflects
the limited narrative possibilities that state constitutions offer. . . .”); Kahn, supra note
218, at 1156 (“State constitutionalism should not . . . splinter the debate over the
possibilities of the rule of law into a Babel of fifty different communities. That, however,
is exactly the effect of the doctrine of unique state sources.”).
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a legally defined and enforceable space created by the overarching
national constitution.235 Thus, there is no obvious reason to require state
constitutions to be as immutable, comprehensive, and countermajoritarian as the Federal Constitution. In fact, because state
constitutions are legally constrained by federal law, they can be very
responsive to popular input without compromising the core commitments
of “American constitutionalism” embodied in the Federal Constitution.236
In short, there is no obvious reason to demand that state constitutions
originate and develop through the same kind of processes as the federal
constitution.
3.

Toward a Deliberative Democracy Justification of State
Constitutionalism

The deliberative model of subnational constitutionalism discussed
above may offer a more compelling account of contemporary state
constitutionalism. First, a deliberative model of state constitutionalism
provides a normative justification for valuing state constitutions as
platforms for popular constitutional opinions. At the federal level,
constitutional change is essentially insulated from popular input because
the Federal Constitution is impossibly hard to amend.237 Consequently,
state constitutions provide perhaps the only opportunity within the U.S.
federal system for popular constitutional law making. In other words,
state constitutions ensure that the popular voice is not excluded from the
evolution of constitutional content. Thus, from a deliberative democracy
viewpoint, one virtue of American federalism is that it allows for
localized popular participation in the evolution of constitutional content
without compromising core constitutional commitments.
Second, a cursory review of contemporary state constitutionalism
suggests that it may in fact provide incentives for popular political
participation and constitutional deliberation. The high amendment and
revision rate for state constitutions suggests that they provide frequent
and affordable opportunities for public input and debate regarding
constitutional issues.238 Recent empirical research also suggests that
state constitutional amendment procedures, which almost universally

235. See surpa Parts I.B.1 and IV.B.1.
236. See Witte, supra note 171, at 475 (concluding that “our federalism permits
vigorous popular democracy to operate in the states because the Federal Constitution
places checks on majoritarian excesses”).
237. See Lutz, supra note 174, at 355-70 (arguing that necessary constitutional
change at the federal level occurs through judicial interpretation because amendment
procedures are arduous).
238. See supra note 231 (discussing state constitutional amendment rates).
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require public ratification,239 may in fact provide meaningful incentives
for grassroots political mobilization.240 Moreover, as the recent debate
regarding same-sex marriage illustrates, state constitutionalism can
contribute to intra-state political dialogue between citizens and groups, as
well as a deeper nation-wide institutional dialogue between the judiciary
and popular government institutions.241 In sum, state constitutions seem
to contribute a great deal to the deliberative and participatory quality of
American democracy.
Thus, the deliberative model of subnational constitutionalism
constructed above may provide a crucial step in accurately understanding
contemporary state constitutionalism. It may be most accurate to
characterize state constitutions as the ever-evolving work product of fifty
decentralized but interconnected deliberative groups. State boundaries
matter because they ensure that constitutional debate and participation
can occur at a more local level; not because state boundaries correspond
to distinct subnational polities with shared norms (demos model). State
constitutional texts matter because they provide a vehicle for
incorporating popular constitutional opinions into the evolution of
constitutional content.

239. In Delaware, the legislature may amend the constitution without a popular
referendum on proposed amendments. See DE. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
240. See, e.g., Mark A. Smith, The Contingent Effects of Ballot Initiatives and
Candidate Races on Turnout, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 700 (2001) (conducting empirical study
regarding ballot initiatives and voter turnout and concluding that ballot measures increase
voter turnout”). Unfortunately, the available empirical research does not distinguish
between legislative ballot initiatives, amendment initiatives, and amendment by
legislative proposal. Id.; see also Tolbert, et al., The Effects of Ballot Initiatives on Voter
Turnout in the American States, 29 AM. POL. RESEARCH 625, 627-28 (2001).
Nevertheless, the general empirical finding that ballot measures increase voter turnout
suggests that allow for constitutional change through referendum and initiative has a
positive impact on political participation.
241. In November 2008, after the California Supreme Court ruled that the state’s
marriage statute unconstitutionally limited marriage to heterosexual couples, see In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (2008), opponents of same-sex marriage mobilized to
secure a constitutional amendment (Proposition 8) limiting marriage to heterosexual
couples. See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks, Truth and Consequences: Mitt Romney,
Proposition 8, and Public Reason, 61 ALA. L. REV. 337 (2010) (discussing the history of
Proposition 8). Proponents of same-sex marriage quickly challenged the proposition in
both state and federal court, but they also began the process of mobilizing grass-roots
support for a constitutional amendment that would repeal Proposition 8. See Steven
Mikulan, Overturning Proposition 8 in 2010 or 2012, LA WEEKLY, Jul. 30, 2009,
available at http://blogs.laweekly.com/ladaily/election/overturning-proposition-8-now/
(discussing the efforts to obtain support for the proposition). The result of this back-andforth has been a heated political debate regarding same-sex marriage that has captured the
attention of Californians and even the nation.
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CONCLUSION
In order to capitalize on the great utility of subnational
constitutionalism, scholars must move past narrow conceptions that
unnecessarily limit the institution’s diverse functionality. The goal of
this Article is to expound an institutional approach to subnational
constitutionalism that will facilitate further exploration of the
institution’s utility. In so doing, the Article argues that one important but
overlooked utility of subnational constitutionalism is its ability to
contribute to the deliberative quality of democracy within federal
regimes.

